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ft.11 »517 Outline of a thesis on
Types of Sophistic Philosophy:
A Comparison of the Sophists and the Pragmatists.
1
Introducti on
I. Purpose of thesis: a study of two types of Sophistic thought:
a comparison of the Sophists and the Pragmatists
.
It is proposed to set forth the teachings of the Sophists
and the Pragmatists and to make a comparison of "both, pp 1-2
II. Transitional Eras: their importance for the history of thought.
pp 2-4
The history of thought alternates between major and minor
periods, the latter of which are sometimes called transitional
eras. Examples of transitional eras Riven. Two selected for
study, the Sophists and the Pragmatists. pp 2-4
The general similarity of the Sophists and tlie Praermatists
exhibited: unti-intellectualism, practical and humanistio
character, similarity in their *?reat leadership. p 4.
Part One: The Sophists
I. The Kistorioal Apnroaoh to the Study of the Sophists.
A. The historical background of the Sophists: their importance
for the history of thought. p 5
1. The historical background and situation which gave rise to
the Sophists. P 5
The successful war of the Greeks against the Persians which
gave rise to a new national consciousness. PP 5-6
The political cause: the rise of the democracy under Pericles,
the reforms of the constitution and the courts. p 6
Sthical and religious causes: the breakdown of social morality,
decay of belief in the ^ods, the rise of humanistic interests
and the demand for young men to train the people for citizenship.
pp 6-7
Philosophical causes: the failure of the ITature philosophers
to arrive at final conclusions respecting reality; the result-
ing mental perplexity and eagerness to approach a new problem,
the problem of man. pp 7-8
2. The importance of the Sophists for their age.
Their importance in opening up fields which have Bince become
important in psychology arid epistemology. PP 8-9
Their importance in linking two philosophical eras, the oosmo-
lofrical and the anthropological. P
i
3. The sources from which the Sophists derived their teachings.
P 9
a. Their acceptance of the flux philosophy as developed by
Heraclitus. p 9
b. Their rejection of the philosophical teachings of the
Eleatics. p 10
c. Their desire for a new field of investigation because of
their intellectual dissatisfaction with previous schools
of thought. p 11
B. The definition of the Sophist: chief types of Sophist thought;
a sketch of the chief representatives of the movement, p 12
1. Definition of the Sophists as lovers of wisdom. The Sophists
as teachers of grammar, poetry, rhetoric. pp 12-13
2. The more important Sophisti: Protagoras, Sorgias, Hippies,
Prodi cu8. pp 13-14
• An Exposition of the Teachings of the Sophists.
A. The Teachings of the Sophists on the subject of Rhetoric,
1. An outline of the teachings of the Sophists as to rhetorio;
their emphasis on form rather than on content. pp 14
a. The Gorgias as the source of our knowledge on this subject.
Rhetoric there defined as grounded In technique rather than
in morality. Criticism of Aristophanes. pp 15
B. The Spisternology of the Sophists,
1. Theory of knowledge as taught by Protagoras; his criterion
of truth; the origin of his doctrine in th« Heraclitean
theory of motion; his doctrine that perception arises from
the meeting of two kinds of motion. pp 17-18
The enunciation of the homo mensura tenet. The doctrine
that knowledge is sense perception. pp 17-18
2. The teaching of Corgias; Lis arguments for Nihilism.
pp 19-22
C. The Ethical Teachings of the Sophists.
1. The relation between their episteraology and ethics, pp 22-23
a. Teachings of the earlier and minor Sophists: the worthless-
ness of customary standards of morality. PP 22-2o
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b. Distinction "between customary and natural right. pp 23-24
The general relativism of the Sophists due to their doct-
rine of sense perception as knowledge and their rejection
of customary morality.
III. General Criticism of the Sophists.
A. Criticism of their educational practioes.
The criticism of Plato regarding the Sophist practice
of receiving fees. Zeller points out that this criti-
cism is not entirely just, but it is criticised here
as a dangerous practice because of the possibility of
corruption. However, Flato criticises the Sophists
from the point of view of the aristocrat. pp 24-26
3. Critioism of the Spiiitemology of the Sophists.
1. The defense of the Sophists by Srote, Oomperz and Schiller.
a. Grote defends the Sophists on the around that they were
called to perform a particular task and did it well. How-
ever he recognises that there was bound to be opposition
between the Sophists and Plato. pp 27-28
b. Oomperz accuses Plato of prejudice and of making Pro-
tagoras say what he never intended to say. Plato is ac-
cused of perverting history at this point. But the main
criticism of Plato that Protagoras really did identify
knowledge with sense perception is not invalidated and
this is the important point here. pp 28-30
c. Schiller's defense of Protagoras is based on his recog-
nition of the instrumental character of the concept. He
criticises Plato because he attempted to construct e
system of metaphysics on the basis of concepts without
relationship to the world of experience. pp 30-33
Schiller suggests that the remedy for the impasse in
philosophy is to revive the theory of Protagoras. However,
Plato's criticism of Protagoras is upheld in spite of the
possible disagreement with the metaphysics of Plato.
pp 32-33
2. Exposition of the criticism of Plato as directed aerainst
the epistemology of Protagoras. pp 33-38
Plato shows that Protagoras has in mind man as individual
and not as genus. It is on this basis that he builds his
refutation. pp 33-34
a. The criterion of Protagoras makes it impossible to account
for error. The problem is discussed in connection with
dreams and dibeases. PP 35-36

In replying constructively to Protagoras, Flato shows that
knowledge is something: more than perception, by indicating
that
(1) Things keep their own proper essences in the knowing re-
lationship, p 37
(2) Knowledge is not perception but reflection on and evalu-
ation of the differences in our perceptions. pp 37-28
Summary of the defects of the criterion of truth and theory
of knowledge advanced by the Sophists.
a. They were guilty of assuming that their doctrine covered
the entire field of epibtemology . Psychology has since
shown that the knowing process is very complex. p 58
b. They were guilty of the error of superficiality. Their
intellectual interests were discursive rather than pro-
found. Plato indicated this in his criticism. p 39
c. They suffered because of inadequate philosophic equipment.
The result was a defective sensationalistic theory of
knowledge, pp 39-40
Criticism of the Ethics of the Sophists.
1. Criticism of their ethics on the erround of relativism.
pp 40-42
This relativism due to their acceptance of the senses
without criticism as the source of ethics. Flato shows
that the analysis of sensation is necessary to judgment
and conduct, pp 41-42
Criticism of the Metaphysi oa of the Sophists,
The failure here is due to the Sophists' humanistic bias,
Protaeroras implied that metaphysics is impossible, but the
reason for its impossibility is the aversion of the Sophists
to rationalistic inquiry into the nature of reality, pp 42-43
Summary.
The defects of the Sophists are due to their meagre scientific
knowledge and lack of instruments of investigation. pp 43-44
But they have made a contribution to philosophy in opening up
a new field of study, that whi ch has as its subjeot, I»Ian.
pp 44-45

Part Two: Pragmatism
Introduc ti on
significance of the rise of Pragmatism in modern thought.
pp 48-52
The background of Pragmatism in science and philosophy, pp 49
The work of Bacon, Hume, Berkeley, USH pp 49-50
The general influence of the modern inductive sciences
pp 50-51
The breakdown of the authoritarian principle in science
and philosophy pp 50-51
The revolt of philosophy against i ntell ec tuali st phil-
osophies, especially. Absolute Idealism pp 51-52
The Origin and Development of Prasrmat ism.
1. The Orig-in of rraemat ism. The work of Peirce, the Founder
pp 52-61
a. An exposition of the ideas developed in Feirce's peper
t
how to make our ideas clear pp 52-55
Sot enough to state that our ideas must be clear,
but we must know how to make them clear pp 53
Peirce' s formula for the making of our ideas clear.
The emergence of the PraOTiatic criterion of truth
and clearness: the doctrine of consequences. Illus-
trations; the controversy over the sacramental inter-
pretations of the church; an exposition of the doctrine
of Force. pp 53-56
b. An Exposition of the social application of the doctrine
of consequences as a guide for action. Peirce's paper.
On the Doctrine of Chances. pp 56-61
x. Individualism and the law of probability. The
certainty of failure for individualism in view of
the doctrine of chances. pp 57-58
y. The logicality of a community of interests in
view of the law of probability, -icoess is dependent
in ideals and conduct won our identifying our
interests with a community wider than ourselves.
pp 59-60
z. The conclusion: the Pragmatism of Peirce carries
with it far reaching social implications, pp 60-61

2. The development of Pragmatism: the work of James and Dewey.
A brief outline and sketch of the life and work of James with
reference to his chief publications, pp 61-62
Pragmatism as developed by Williams James.
The coinage of the word Pragmatism; the word Pragmaticism as
used by Peirce p 62
James' concept of Philosophy as rooted in psychology. Philo-
sophy as the clash of human temperaments. The importance of
seeim thines in one's own peculiar way, pp 63-66
James' division of philosophers into rationalistic (tender-
hearted) and Empirical (tough minded)- pp 63-66
a. Pragmatism defined as a method of philosophy, pp 66-67
b. The underlying causes for the rise of Pragmatism: the
inadequacy of the intellectual istic systems of
philosophy. p 68
The revolt against refinement in philosophy and the refusal to
start with the particular facts of exne rience. p 69
The revolt against an intellectual i sra that leaves human emotions
and interests out of account. Criticism of Leibniz and Bradley,
pp 70-71
Criticism of Absolute Idealism:
a. Because of its totally speculative character pp 71-72
b. Because of its remoteness from human experience
pp 73-76
3. The technical exposition of Pragmatism from the point of
view of James.
Pragmatism is offered as an adequate substitute for intel-
lualistic philosophise, especially Absolute Idealism.
a. Pragmatism as a criterion of truth. pp 76-77
Criticism of the copy theory of truth: its inadequacy
The Fragmatic statement that ideas are true, if they have
satisfactory results in human experience.
The criterion of Pragmatism urged "because of
1. Its scientific character P 80
2. Because it recognizes the function of new ideas
in relationship to old ones. P QO

3. 3ecause it recognizes the instrumental truth in
ideas rather than intrinsic truth in them p 80
b. Pragmatism in relationship to Metaphysics, p 81
An attack on the tradition view of Substance, pp 81-83
Examination of the traditional attitude toward material-
ism and theism, Thft comparison of the traditional with
the pragmatic account of these attitudes. pp 83-85
Exposition of the pragmatic evaluations of the ideas of
God, design, substance, etc. pp 84-86
James's exposition of the doctrine of a finite God. 87-88
x. A necessity in a pluralistic world p 88
y. A necessity of our emotional and volitional nature
p 88
z. The pragmatic advantages of a finite God. p 89
he Instrumental ism of John Dewey.
Dewey's attack on traditional metaphysics,
Failure of Greek philosophy because of its derivation
from art. Examples: Plato and Aristotle. Its fail-
ure due to regarding concepts as matters for contempla-
tion only. pp 89-90
Failure of traditional empiricism, ancient and modern.
Examples: Heraclitus and 3ergson. Failure due to not
regarding the world of experience as a challenge to
improvement. pp 92-93
Exposition of the true function of philosophy: observa-
tion, experimentation, initiation of procedure for im-
provement of the actual world of experience, pp 93-94
a. Dewey's concept of the nature of existence*
The Precariousness of existence, because of the combina-
tion of the stable and unstable. pp 94-95
The need of the establishment of control of existence
because of its admittedly precarious nature, pp 94-95
b, Dewey's concept of the nature of consciousness, pp 95-96
The biological and naturalistic character of conscious-
ness .
Consciousness not an entity, but a grouping of meanings.
i
o. Dewey' 8 teachings of the place of thought in experi-
ence, pp 97-101
(1) The antecedents of thought: Stimuli in the
eternal world.
(2) Criticism of the Platonic concept of thought.
Thought is concrete and purposive.
(3) The instrumentality of thought.
d. Lewey's teaching about the social order. p 101
Criticism of the historic concept of the state as an
entity.
(1) Because it is founded on an indefensible de-
ductive logic. p 102
(2) Because it gives a view of a state as static
and complete. p 102
The real concept of the state as something related
to an oranic with individuals. pp 102-104
e. Dewey's ethical teaching.
Criticism of ethics as rules for achieving fixed ends.
The fiction of a fixed or ultimate cood. p 104
Advantae-es of the pragmatic view of ethics as divorced
from metaphysics, pp 104-105
f. Dewey' 8 exposition of the theory of values.
Dewey says values are not eternal or perfect. The tempo-
rary character of values. pp 105-106
Subjective character of values. pp 106-107
The relation of conduct and values. pp 106-108
The fate of values. pp 107-108
A summary of the principal teachings of Pragmatism, pp 108-110
Criticism of Pragmatism. pp 108-110
a. It is inadequate as criterion of truth. pp 111-113
X. Judgments are not necessarily true because they are
useful. p 112
2. Judgments only true as they function harmoniously
in a system of judgments. PP 112-113
1I
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b. It is inadequate as a philosophy of science,
1. It takes no account of sciences other than biology,
o. It is epistemologically ambiguous and unsatisfactory.
1. The contradictory epistecioloey of James, p 113
2. Criticism of trie episteraoloerical realism of Dewey*
pp 115-116
d. Criticism of Pragmatism from the point of view of meta-
physics, p 1]6
1. Its inability to furnish guarantees as to the moral
stability of the universe. pp 117-118
2. Its tendency to oversimplify the problems of meta-
physics, pp 118-119
Z). -he necessity of philosophy to raise again the pro-
blems that Pragmatism either does not solve or
evades. p 119
e. Concluding summary of general criticism of Pragmatism.
1. Its ambiguity. pp 119-120
2. Its tendency to relativism. p 120
3. Its neglect of ends in its zeal for means. p 120

Part Three
A Critical Comparison of the Sophists and Pragma! ists
In this part of the thesis it is proposed to determine the stand-
point of the Sophists and the Pragraat ists as Humanistic, p 122
I. The humanistic standpoint of the Sophists and Pragma tists.
p 123
This humanism is manifest in the common aversion of the
Sophists and the Pragma tists toward me taphysic
s
t their
emphasis on social and practical affairs. p 124
1. The causes contributing to this humanism are
a. In the caoe of the Sophists the military
and national growth of the nation; the ap-
plication of intelligence to political and
social problems. pp 124-125
b. In the case of the Pragraati sts , the advance
of science, the development of the inductive
logic, the revolt from metaphysics as inade-
quate in the service of experience. pp 126-127
c. The humanistic concept of religion in the
Pragraati sts represents a moral revolt from the
bloodless character of Absolute Idealism. Re-
ligion is regarded as instrumental in social
service. pp 128-129
II. Criticism of the Sophists and the Pracmatiets.
The final criticism of these philosophies will depend upon
the technical soundness or unsoundness of their positions.
pp 129-130
1. Criticism of their criterion of truth.
Inadequacy of the criterion advanced by Protagoras,
that Knowledge is sensation* pp 130-131
Inadequacy of the Pragmatic doctrine that truth lies
in satisfactory consequences. pp 151-132
Pragmatism errs in making all our cognitive states
instrumental. In effect the reasons why ideas are
true are not recognized, and the reasons ^iven by
Pragmatism are defective. pp 131-133
2. Criticism of the epistemology of the Sophists and
the Pragmatists.
Epistemology of Protagoras apparently naive dualism,
but in reality is realistic monism. p 133

Zpistemology of James wavers between dualism and idealism.
He is guilty of ambiguity. p 134
I^pistemology of Dewey is naturalistic and realistic.
pp 154-155
The criticism of each of these epistemologie s is that
either they make no place for the self or for the object.
They are criticized from the point of view of dualism
which does make provision for both the self and the
object. p 135
3. Criticism of the psychology of the Sophists end the Prag-
matis ts
.
The sensational character of the psychology of the Sophists*
p 135
The psychology of James is functional with a trend toward
behaviorism. p 136
Dewey is behavi or i stic in his psychology p 136
The criticism of these psychologies is bssed on the position
of self psychology, that experience to be real must be ex-
perience for a self. p 136
4* Criticism of Values in the Sophists and the Pragraat ists.
p 138
The Sophists fail to develop any theory of value, but would
have to develop one that is subjective in character end
instrumental rather than permanent. p 138
James cannot give us any guarantee of the permanence of
values because of the weakness in his concept of a finite
God . p 139
Dewey cannot develop any adequate theory of social values,
because values are essentially values for persons; and
he cannot find any adequate ground for the permanence of
values because of his aversion to a metaphysically ideal-
istic view of things. P 140
a. Pragmatism fails to look beyond the plane of biol-
ogical living. But man lives a large part of his life
on the non-biological plane and thought as other than
instrumental must be laken into account. pp 140-141
While Pragmatism calls attention to the importance of
social values, it neglects many values that are as important
as those to which it calls attention. pp 142-143

Values must finally "be determined as worthy and permanent
by reference to standards of judgment:
(a) They must be ground objectively in the nature
of reality.
(b) They must be judered by some standard of a
rational sort or we cannot save them from rela-
tivity and incoherence. pp 142-143
If this is not done, we cannot take account of true morality or
true art. It is for this reason that Pragmatism fsils to develop a
theory of value that is satisfying. p 144

1TYPES OP SOPHISTIC THOUGHT
A COMPARISON OP THS SOPHISTS AND TH^ PRAG-MATISTS
INTRODUCTION
I, The purpose of the thesis: a study of two types of
sophistic thought: a comparison of the Sophists and the
Pragmatist8.
It is the purpose of this thesis to set forth consecutively
the teaohings of the Sophists in the realm of philosophy, notably
the work of Gorgias and Protagoras, the principal representatives
of the Sophist movement in Greece. The exposition will bear in
mind the historic, political, educational and philosophical back-
grounds out of which the Sophists developed their contributions
to the life and thought of Greece. Their teaching will be de-
veloped with reference to the fields of theory of knowledge,
ethics and metaphysics. Finally, an attempt will be made to
criticise and evaluate their importance in the history of philo-
sophy. This study will constitute the first part of the discus-
sion. It is also proposed to make a study of the Pragmatists,
especially, the more prominent representatives of the movement
in America, with some reference to the movement in England,
particularly the work of P.C.S. Schiller. Attention will be
called to the reasons underlying the rise of Prajrmatism in mod-
ern philosophy, its relationship to previous movements will be
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noted, especially its relationship with Absolute Idealism. A
systematic presentation of the work of Peirce, James and Dewey will
be made; and finally, there will be an attempt at criticism and eva
liiation of Pragmatism with reference to its importance as a method
in philosophy; its doctrine of truth and its attempts to construct
a metaphysics. This exposition, criticism and evaluation will con-
stitute the second part of the discussion. Finally, a critical
comparison of both the Sophists and the Pragmatists will be insti-
tuted; their peculiar and common defects and excellencies will be
set forth, and a comparative evaluation of their worth and place
in philosophy will be attempted.
II. Transitional ^ras: their importance for the history
of philosophy.
The history of thought, like that of events, is character-
ised by growth and decay. As illustrations of the principle here
enunciated let us consider the chief periods in the history of
philosophy. Among the outstanding examples of these brilliant,
creative epochs in the history of thought may be mentioned the
schools of Plato and Aristotle in Greece; the development of
Scholasticism in the Middle Ages; and in modern times, the mag-
nificent creation of the Critical Philosophy of Kant, succeeded
by its culmination in the Objective Idealism of Hegel. Alterna-
ting with these major movements are less conspicuous endeavors
of the human mind after truth, periods of adjustment, transition
and sfceptioism. These have been rightly called, "transitional
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eraa" and as such they are of great importance for the stu-
dent of the history of thought. Among these transitional eras
it is sufficient to note only two or three of the more impor-
tant; namely, the Age of the Sophists, that age in Sreek philo-
sophy which is roughly indicated as falling within the latter
half of the fifth and the earlier half of the fourth century
before Christ, an age of decisive importance for the subse-
quent history of philosophy; the Age of Skepticism that narked
the decline and extinction of Qreek thought after the death
of Aristotle (384-322), an age in which the possible validity
of knowledge is denied; the Age of the Renaissance, with its
inception of new knowledge, its revival of classical learning,
and its prophecies of new attempts to undertake afresh the ad-
venture of philosophy; and, finally, the Age of the Enlighten-
ment of eighteenth century Europe, with its assurance that the
human mind was competent to solve problems that had hitherto
baffled men, an indication of that serene, if shallow optimism
2
that was the chief mark of the age. Nothing need here be said
of contemporary types of transitional thought, except to men-
tion Pragmatism which is possibly the most significant and
popular of recent movements in philosophy, a popularity due
to its brilliant leadership, able presentation, and its close-
ness to the modern experimental sciences. Of these various
1. A. C. Armstrong, Transitional Eras . See Chapters One and "wo.
2. W. Windelband, A History of Philosophy
, p 487
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types of transitional thinking, two are here selected for in-
vestigation and appraisal; one, the Sophists; the other, the
Pragraatists.
Inasmuch as the thinking of the Sophists and the Prag-
matists is characterised by similar reactions to the history
of philosophy, it is well that we should note what these sim-
ilarities are. They are "both anti-intellectual in trend;
both are definitely empirical; both avoid systematic meta-
physical development; both turn away from abstractions to
practical affairs; both may be described as essentially human-
istic philosophies. It is true that the legacy of thoueht to
which the Sophists fell heir was intellectually immature and
scientifically incomplete, whereas Pragmatism has entered upon
an inheritance rich in scientific achievement, but the tend-
ency and emphasis are the same in both types of thought. Fur-
thermore, there is a correspondence in the methods of both
schools, for they dwell alike on the supreme importance of the
empirical data in philosophy and appeal to particulars as
against universals as the starting point of their investiga-
tions. It is also noteworthy that there is a remarkable cor-
respondence in their types of leadership; for, if the Sophists
were fortunate in having educators like Protagoras and ^orgias
carry their standards, the Pragmatists are not less fortunate
in having men like Peirce, James, Schiller and Dewey as their
advocates and leaders. With this preliminary statement before
us we may now turn to the development of our thesis.

5PART ONE: THE SOPHISTS
I* The historical approach to the study of the Sophists.
A. The historical "backgrounds of the Sophists; their
importance in the history of thought.
1. The historical background and situation whioh
gave rise to the Sophists.
Zeller * has indicated that the chief causes
of the rise of the Sophists in Greece were his-
torical, political, philosophical, ethical and
religious. Following his authority it may be
noted that the historical conditions under which
the Sophists arose were the stirring national
impulses to expansion following the Greek vic-
tories over the Persians in their war for na-
tional salvation with the greatest Oriental
2
empire of ancient times.
The hordes of Asia were no match for the finely trained
bands of Athenian hoplites, and the plain of Marathon (490 B.C.)
was strewn with Persian dead. Decisive as was the battle of
Marathon, the victory of the Greeks was even more complete at
sea, for the unwieldy ships of the Persians lured into the
narrow straits of Salamis were no match for the swift sailing
triremes of the Greeks, and the tide of Oriental invasion was
rolled back and broken at the battle of Salamis (480 B.C.).
1. Zeller, Pre-Socratic Philosophy
,
Vol. 2, pp 395-407
2. Grote, History of Greece. Vol. 4. Chs 36-41 -Pn-r account o-r

With the ebbing of the Persian invasion there flowed in a tide
of new nationalism, and a new consciousness emerged in Greece.
She became definitely identified with the west, and her role
henceforth was that of defender of western civilization.
Important among the political causes underlying the rise
of the Sophists was the development of the Democracy under the
leadership of Pericles, (490-429 B.C.)
1
This movement was
accompanied by important modifications of the Athenian Con-
stitution, the reform of the Areopagus, and in general, by an
effort to mafce the Athenians a self-governing people, ^he
democracy was distinctly favorable to the growth of the Sophists
because of their interest in politics and ethics, and further,
because of their high regard for eloquence as an important
factor in political and public life. It was natural, there-
fore, in such an age that the Sophists should find a place of
great influence and power.
Among the ethical and religious oauses which gave rise
to the Sophists may be mentioned the break: down of social moral-
ity consequent upon the tyranny of larger over smaller states,
the decay of the popular conceptions of the gods inherited from
the age of Hesiod and Homer, and the general development of
literature in the direction of Humanism. Coupled with these
forces was the laclc of a public school system in Greece. At a
time when there was great demand for knowledge and no organized
system of instruction capable of satisfying that demand, the
1. Grote, A History of Greece
,
Vol. 1, pp 313-332

Greeks turned to the Sophists who gave them an itinerant
ministry of instruction. They gave that instruction in science,
grammar, rhetoric, oratory, disputation to large and attentive
crowds of young men who flocked from country and city alike to
hear them. And "because they claimed to prepare men for citizen-
ship in the state they were applauded and successful, 'lomperz
has described the Sophists as half journalists and half pro-
fessors.^" But at any rate they were men of wide general know-
ledge. This was at once the source of their philosophical
2
weakness and their popular strength, for the fact that they
were compelled to divide their interests among* many fields led
to an inevitable superficiality in their teachings.
But a cause greater than all these demands attention.
The most important of all the reasons for the rise of the
Sophists was philosophical. Philosophy before the Sophists had
made Nature its object of investigation, and had created an un-
3
paralleled perplexity in the Greek mind. Neither the early
Ionians, "'hales (o. 640 B.C.), Anaxinander fo 611 B.C.), Anaxi-
mines, flatter part of 6th century, B.C.) nor other thinkers of
that time had been able to determine the nature of things
through the use of their formula for the reduction of nature to
a material invariant, as for example, water, air or the undeter-
mined. Likewise the school of Heraclitus fc 535-475 B.C.) with
1. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers
, p 414.
2. Ibid, p 4TF:
3. Zeller, Pre-Socratio Philosophy. Vol 1, pp 811-638; Vol 2.
p 1-373":

8its emphasis on reality as the flowing, guided "by Reason, pro-
duced no agreement among the minds of Greece as to the nature
of things. The same may "be said of the Atomists of whom Demo-
critus (c 460 B.C.) was the most popular representative, and
the later natural philosophers with their pluralistic solution
of the world problem, to name ^mpedocles fborn c. 490 ^.C.) and
Anaxagoras (c 500-428 B.C.) only. Neither oufrht the ^leatics,
Parmenides fborn c. 513 B.C.) and other representatives of the
static concept of reality to be overlooked in this connection.
In general it may be said that the failure of the preceding
philosophers, notably the Heracliteans and the ^leatics to at-
tain a metaphysical solution of the problem of Nature led the
Sophists to emphasise a neglected aspect of philosophical study,
or rather a new aspect of investigation for which the time was
now ripe. This field was man himself.
2. The importance of the Sophists for the age in which
they lived.
It is the situation sketched above which leads us now to
consider the importance of the Sophists for the age in which
they lived. It is a commonplace that the Sophists served to
link the age of the Nature philosophers with the age of So-
crates (490-399 B.C.). It is this that serves to give them
their great historical importance. But their place in phil-
osophy is due to the fact that they turned in bewilderment
frQ.m the researches of their predecessors to the problem
of knowledge and the nature of man. In short, they adopted
i
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an attitude of agnosticism towards the metaphysical interest
and concentrated their attention upon those fields of study
which in the hands of later masters have "become the fields of
psychology, logic and epistenology. It is here that they form
the logical link between the past and the future. Turning
away from the cosmolofcical, they endeavor to achieve success
in the anthropological field of philosophy.
Our chief interest lies in following the thought of
Protagoras and Gorgias, rather than that of Prodicue and Fip-
pias, as the former appear in Plato as the protagonists of
the Sophist theories of thought and knowledge.
3. The sources from which the Sophists derive the mater-
ials of their teaching, These sources are chiefly as
follows
:
a. The philosophy of the flowing as found in Hera-
clitus.
1
The formula, "All things pass away" sums
up his teaching as expressed in his great work on
Nature. Everything is in a state of eternal flux.
Nothing can escape final destruction, not even the
gods themselves being exempt from the inevitable
end. Everything is to be resolved into fire, "^ut
the change is orderly because it is directed by
the All Controlling Reason. SucV a sayinfr as the
following
"We never step into the same stream twice"
1. Zeller, The Pre-Socratic Philosophy
,
transl. by S.F. Alleyne,
Vol 2, pp 11-47
2. Ibid, Vol 1, pp 580-608
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is sufficient to indicate how the phenomenal world
was uppermost in the thought of Heraclitus. It was
this phase that interested the Sophists to the neg-
lect of the Heraclitean doctrine of the logos. And
accordingly from Heraolitus was derived the mechanis-
tic interpretation of the nature of the world. There
is no teleology apparent in the wearisome and endless
change of things. The only permanence is the perman-
ence of change. It was the generalization of this
idea and its transference to the field of knowledge
that made the Sophists skeptical as to the possibility
of permanent truth in an ever changing world,
d. The rejection of the teaching of the ^leatics as
to the reality of the One. The ^leatics, especially
1
Parmenides, had attempted a distinction between
knowledge {e.rr,<rr^^ ^ ) and opinion (So^<^), Opinion
was concerned with the Many, the world of the senses
and illusion. Knowledge could only be of the One,
It was a Sharply drawn distinction betr/een the truth
that could only be learned by the intellect and the
apparent truth that could do nothing but force it-
self on the senses. And it was the dualism of the
1. Zeller, The Pre-Sooratic Philosophy
,
Vol 2 pp 11-47
(
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One and the Many to which this distinction was
1
applied. Zeno had gone on to prove "by means of his
famous paradoxes (the flying arrow, the grain of
wheat, and so forth) the unreality of motion and of
the Many, and to state that only the One is real.
This was a severe intellectualisra that was rejected
by the Sophists and carried with it the refusal to
accept the Sleatic doctrine of the rational founda-
tion of truth. Here again was a cause of metaphysi-
cal skepticism.
0. The confusion resulting from the contradictory
2
conclusions of the Atomists and the Pluralists.
Not only were the conclusions of the later pluralis-
tic school at variance with the doctrines of the
Eleatics due to their emphasis on the reality of
the manifold world of experience, but they served
once more to emphasise to the Sophists the impos-
sibility of finding any metaphysical solution of the
constitution of the world. This was one of the de-
cisive factors in their rejection of the voice of
history as to what reality was reducible to and led
them to turn away from these speculations as "dull,
stale and unprofitable" to a new field which at any
rate had the merit of having been unexplored by the
energies of the mind. Henceforth the supreme interest
1. Zeller, The Pre-Sooratic Philosophy
,
Vol 1, pp 609-627
2. Ibid, Vol, 2, See pp 117 to 373 for discussion of
these schools.
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of the Sophists was to lie in the study of what seemed
to them important aspects of consciousness and exper-
ience, the field of the senses. To this they were led
by the observation of the external world itself and
by their interest in a psychology which had found its
development in a materialistic interpretation in the
hands of Democritus. To this they pave their best
attention, and in spite of the criticism to which
they were subject, the fact remains that they are the
pioneers in opening up to human observation an entire-
ly new set of problems, problems which have since be-
come central in the fields of psychology, logic and
epistemology.
B. The definition of Sophist; the chief types of Sophist thought:
a sketch of the chief representatives of the Sophist movement.
1. Definition of the term Sophist, ^he Sophists are de-
fined as men of wisdom. nhe term (<fo<f>6^) connotes "wise".
The noun fro/ i(rr»fs) is derived from the adjective f^o^os)
and the Sophist is accordingly defined as a wise man.^
By this is meant that the Sophists are lovers of wisdom.
In this sense, then, the Sophists are teachers and
lovers of philosophy, for the philosopher was originally
defined as a lover of wisdom. Of course, philosophy was
understood to be wider in general meaning in this connec-
tion than is now the case when so many special disciplines
have attained a state of independence and are taught as
separate subjects. In short, the Sophists were concerned
1. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers
.
Vol 1, p 416
(
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with the whole field of the new learning of their day.
The Chief representatives of the school taught their
own specialties. Thus, the field of Protagoras
1
was
grammar, style, poetry and oratory, as well as theory
2
of knowledge and ethics. Gorgias introduced into
Athens the technical study of forensic rhetoric. Pro-
dicus using literature and ethics stressed the teach-
4
infr of morality. Hippias and a younger generation of
Sophists taught technical and scientific excellence as
desirable ends to he attained in life. He had a repu-
tation for versatility comparable to the men of the
Italian Renaissance.
2. Some of the more important Sophists; Protagoras
Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias.
a. Protagoras of Abdera (c 480-411 B.C.) His
great reputation was as a teacher of rhetoric. In
all likelihood he was the first to call himself a
Sophist and he certainly taught for pay. Being
accused of impiety he suffered banishment in 411
^ 5
B.C. His most importnnt writings were: Truth,
and a treatise on the Gods.
6
,b. Gorgias of Leontini (born about 480 B.C.)
came to Athens from Sicily in 427 B.C« to seek the
1. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers
, pp 441 et seq. Cf. Ch 6 for
discussion of Protagoras.
2. Ibid, pp 477 et seq.
3. Ibid, pp 429-430
4. Ibid, Vol 2, p 431
5. Ibid, Vol 2, pp 440-411
6. Ibid, pp 476-482
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aid of the Athenians in the war with Syracuse. The
remainder of his life he spent in Athens and at Larissa,
professing the art of rhetoric. His style is reputed to
have been rich, ornate and elaborate, and although his
influence on inferior orators was vicious, nevertheless
he greatly influenced the orator, Demosthenes. Our best
authority for the view of Gorgias on rhetoric is the
1
dialogue named for him by Plato.
o* There is little that can be said with assurance
2
about the remaining two Sophists. Prodicus is reputed
to have been an expert in the study of synonyms. He is
said to have had as his pupils Isocrates and Euripides.
As to Hippias of Elis, he is described in Hippias Major
as a man who is full of conceit. He had the reputation
of being a pedant, a dilettante in literature and like
Prodicus greatly interested in the use of words.
II. An Exposition of the Teaohings of the Sophists.
A. The teachings of the Sophists on the subject of Rhetoric.
1. The general implications of Sophist epistemology
for rhetoric.
It is interesting to observe how the logic and
epistemology of the Sophists influence all their
other spheres of intellectual and moral activity.
The field of rhetoric is a striking example of the
viciousness of the Homo mensura tenet. The Sophists
1. Plato, Gorgias
, Jowett's translation. Vol 1
2. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, Vol 2, p 385
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gave first place to the utility of eloquence. They
regarded the form of eloquence as more important than
its content. And it is easy to see why the Sophists
sought to divert the attention of the orator from con-
tent to form. For, if their position is correct, name-
ly, that there is no such thing as truth, then truth
certainly cannot be the objective of the orator. Accord-
ingly, the Sophists naturally paid greater attention to
form than to content. Indeed, form is the all important
thing with them.
a. Our most important source for the Sophists 1
idea of what rhetoric should be is the Ooreias.
Here we find that Gorgias regards rhetoric as
entirely divorced from moral considerations.
Throughout the dialogue we get the impression that
it is the mechanics of speech that is important
rather than thought. What is Rhetoric? is the
question proposed by the Gorgias. The answers
are numerous, for rhetoric is successively de-
fined as the art which deals with discourse; the
art which deals with things by means of words
rather than by means of silence; it is the art
that uses words which have to do with the greatest
and best things; it is the art of persuading in
the law courts regarding the just and the unjust.
In all these positions to which Gorgias success-
ively retreats there is no hint of moral atmosphere
in respect to rhetoric. It is Socrates who shows
that rhetoric is something more than the use of
X. Plato, Gorgias
. 454 B.
»t
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words; for a rhetorician, if he is to talk about justice,
must be a just man, exactly as a carpenter must be familiar
with his subject, if he is to talk about carpentry, ^ven
though we may regard the satire of Aristophanes in the
1
Clouds as unjust to Socrates, and even though the burlesque
of this play adds nothing to our knowledge in the way of
constructive criticism, nevertheless, it affords us insight
into the manners of Sophistic eloquence.
We find Aristophanes calling attention to the base
principles of the Sophists. Ke dwells upon their absurd
and affected language, the oddities of their manners. So-
crates who is the target of his comic criticism is repre-
sented as singular in appearance, uncouth in figure, and
constantly given to abstractions. V7e see Socrates placed
aloft, suspended in mid air, and functioning as an inno-
vator of new customs and ideas. T,7hile due allowance must
be made for the conservation of Aristophanes and his con-
tempt for democracy, nevertheless, his satire is useful
as calling attention to the very facts that we are de-
veloping, that is, the great attention given by the
Sophists to forms, manners, gestures, etc., and their
striking neglect of the principle that true oratory is
grounded in morality. Apart from this element in the
criticism of Aristophanes, it must be admitted that he
adds nothing to our understanding of the Sophists.
1. Aristophanes, The Clouds
>
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B The Epistemology of The Sophists.
1. Protagoras' theory of knowledge; his criterion
of truth.
Making wide generalizations from the flux
philosophy of Heraclitus, Protagoras drew the conclu-
sions that inasmuch as all things are in a state of be-
coming, then permanence and objectivity are impossible
to knowledge. The form of his argument is as follows:
a. Everything, says Heraclitus, is in motion. Pro-
tagoras in expounding this doctrine holds that there
are only two kinds of motion, doing and suffering.
Only by acting or by being acted upon do things re-
ceive their qualities, and only ty being brought
into relation to things can objects get a deter-
minate character. uence things do not exist apart
from relations, neither do they exist absolutely,
that is, in a state of independence. In short,
things only exist by becoming.^"
b. The origin of our perceptions is traceable to
2
the meeting of two kinds of motion. Objects in
motion meet our sense organs, and it is the meet-
ing of these motions that gives rise to sensation.
Therefore, Protagoras continues, as objects act
differently upon different men, they are for each
man just what they appear to be to him and no more.
1. Theaetetus, p 152
2. Ibid, p 156.
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Hence, there arises the famous Homo mensura
tenet
:
"Man is the measure of all things, of
things that are, that they are; and
of things that are not, that they
are not." 1
In other words, there is no auch thing as universal
agreement as to the nature of things. Hence, also
there is no universal, objectively valid truth
about anything in the realm of perception. nhis is
the psychological basis of Protagoras 1 doctrine of
2
perception.
c. Continuing the development of his position,
Protagores advocates this sensational nominalism
and defines truth as he understands it. In Theae-
tetus (152) Protagoras is quoted as saying
"Knowledge is perception."
And this is the view universally ascribed by Plato
to Protagoras. Thus, for example, we see again
that Socrates attributes the saying to him in a
fine bit of irony as to why Protagoras should be
preferred to any other man as a teacher, if his
saying is to be taken at its face value. (Theaetetus
161). Also again in the same dialogue Socrates at-
tributes to Protagoras the saying that opinion is
1. Theaetetus, p. 152
2. Zeller, The Pre-Socratlc Philosophy
,
Vol 1, p 451
t
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truth. (Theaetetus 170-171). And once in the Kuthy-
demus, Protagoras is quoted as saying that no man can
say anything but what is true, that there is no such
thing as falsehood. A man must either say what is
true or say nothing, this being a legitimate deduction
from the position claimed by Plato as that of Prota-
goras. However, the Platonic interpretation hap been
sharply challenged at this point. We shall take oc-
casion later to note in detail the elaborate defense
made of the Protagorean position by Grote, Comperz and
Schiller. At present we are concerned only with the
interpretation of Plato as to what Protagoras really
taught. It is only fair to note that the mheaetetus,
a dialogue composed after the death of Protagoras, is
much more conceptual in its theory of knowledge than
the Protagoras, which by comparison is quite friendly
to the great Sophist. The Theaetetus is definitely
committed to a rationalistic interpretation of know-
ledge, and it is this dialogue which is regarded by
philosophers who are friendly to Protagoras as being
quite unfair in its treatment of what Protagoras
really meant. However, Plato's interpretation must be
taken into account, and we are concerned at present
only with this.
The teaching of Gorgias as to theory of knowledge and cri-
terion of truth.
The position of Gorgias is diametrically opposite in
T
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its inception to that of Protagorss, but its results
for thought are identical with those reached by him.
The position advocated by the Sophist of Leontini is
commonly known as Nihilism, The argument for extreme
individualism is as follows:
1
a. Nothing exists. A thing cannot be and not be
at the same time. But Non-Being is and therefore
it cannot be and not be at the same time. This,
however, is false, for we cannot conceive of Non-
Being as existing, ^ith respect to Being, either
it must exist or it does not exist. But if a thing
exists, it must be either derived or infinite. But
it cannot be derived for then it must be derived
from Non-Being, and we cannot think of Non-Being as
existing. On the other hand, if a thing is unde-
rived, it must be infinite, but if the infinite ex-
ists, it must either exist in itself or elsewhere,
and this is unthinkable. Therefore, whether Beinpr
be regarded as infinite or as underived, it is non-
existent. Fotf, if we suppose Being to be derived
we suppose it to have arisen from either Non-Being
or Being. But it cannot have arisen from Non-Being,
for then Being would have arisen from Nothing.
Neither can anything be derived from Being, for
then it would not be Being, but something else;
namely, a Becoming.
1. The outline follows Zeller who gives an extract from
Sextus 3mpiricus (Math VII 65-87 on Corgias' treatment
of the non-existent.
c
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b. Furthermore, Gorgias continued: Being must either
be One or Many, but it is neither. For what is One can
have no corporeal magnitude, and what has no corporeal
magnitude cannot exist. Hence Being cannot be One, "Put
neither can it be Many, for the Many can have no unity,
and if there is no real unity in the Many but only a
number of unities, then there can be no real plurality.
Therefore Being cannot be the Many. Therefore Being is
neither one nor Many.
c. And again: If Being exists it cannot be moved. But
the world is full of motion and change. All motion is
change. But this involves the Becoming of Non-^eing.
Now Becoming or motion involves division and this again
involves the cancellation of Being. It is evident then
that Being is as unthinkable as Non-Being, Therefore
Being as well as Non-Beinp does not exist. Therefore
Nothing exists.
d. Gorgias then goes on to say that even if Being does
exist it cannot be known. That which exists is not iden-
tical with anything that can be known, and what is thought
is not identical with what exists. Otherwise what every
man thinks must have existence. Therefore a false pre-
sentation would be impossible.
e. Finally, if even anything could be known it could
not be imparted by means of knowledge. For words cannot
produce intuitions in men's minds, or at least only dif-
ferently in different minds. Thus Gorgias arrives at
(Q
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his nihilism. There is no lenowledge that has claim to
universal validity.
C. The ethical teachings of the Sophists: an exposition of their
ethical Relativism.
1. There is a close relation, as would be expected, between
the criterion of truth or theory of taaowledge maintained
by the Sophists and their theory of ethics, their ethical
relativism. This is not difficult to see, for if the
Homo mensura tenet be true as Protagoras contends, or if
Nihilism as expounded by ftorgias be valid, then it fol-
lows that there can be only an ethical relativism or no
ethics at all. To take for example the position of Pro-
tagoras, if what appears to every man is true, then
logioally what appears to be right to every man must be
1
right as well. This carries with it the implication
that there is no universally valid or objective standard
of truth. And so there can really be no science of ethics.
However, this did not deter the Sophists from elaborating
a system of ethios, and we may now consider just what they
taught
:
a. The earlier and minor Sophists seem to have
stressed the worthlessness of all the practical
arts and also to have held in contempt the cus-
tomary standards of morality. This they did be-
cause they held that constant change makes it
1. For discussion of this point, see Zeller, The Pre-Socratio
Philosophy
, Vol 2, pp 475.
rc
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impossible to maintain a strict standard of morality.
Hence, they turned to purely psychological considera-
tions in their quest for a criterion of morality.
b. The distinction between natural and positive
2
right is of importance, particularly in connection
with the teaching of Hippias. This Sophist held that
customary morality was altogether repugnant. And in
its place he advocated the theory of natural right
with its grave possibilities of menace if carried to
its logical conclusion. It is easy to see the trans-
ition here from the so-called morality of nature to
the right of the stronger. However, in spite of the
defective ethics of the Sophists generally, most of
them have been regarded as men who were morally in
3
earnest. Gomperz holds that Protagoras was a dili-
gent and painstaking student with a desire for clear-
ness, order and precision. He cites in support of
this statement the debate between Protagoras and Peri-
cles on murder and the fixing of responsibility there-
for. It seems that in a game in which spears were
thrown, a man was killed by a flying spear, ^he
question in debate was; who or what was responsible,
the man or the spear? It may also be said in passing
that Antiphon, a less well known Sophist, was the
author of treatises on moral subjects, the names only
of which are now extant. It is said that his works
on Truth, The Art of Consolation, Concord, all have
1. Xenophon, Memorabilia, IV 4-14
2. Protagoras, 237 C
3. Goraperz, Greek Thinkers, Vol 1, pp 440-441, pp 446-447
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ethics in one or another of its phases, as their sub-
ject matter.
The outstanding fact as to the ethical instruction
of the Sophists is their hunanisra and relativism, Es-
pecially is this true where the doctrine of natural as
opposed to customary right is taught. The fact that
mortal law in Greece as elsewhere was founded on custom
led gradually to the breakdown of current morality.
That is to say, the teachings of the Sophists as to the
right of the stronger led them to regard civil right as
a hindrance to its exercise. Thus it appears that this
relativism and its implications is not only inadequate
as a basis of conduct, but also fraught with grave menace
to an orderly social group,
III. General criticism of the Sophists.
A, Their educational practices.
Platonic criticism of the Sophists is particularly sharp
1
of their practice in receiving fees for their services.
This is mentioned frequently with irony in the dialogues,
and much has been made of the matter by historians of the
period. The evidence is abundant enough to indicate that
2
the practice was well established and wide spread. Zeller
has taken minute notice of the matter in his Pre-Socratics,
and seems to have arrived at a sound conclusion respecting
the grave possibilities to which the system would lead
and undoubtedly did lead in unscrupulous hands. He shows
that while it is undoubtedly true that the Sophists did
1. Zeller, The Pre-Socralic Philosophy , vol 2, pp 436-445
«
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receive fees for their lectures, nevertheless, there can
"be no legitimate ground for criticism unless it can be
shown that their demands in this respect were exorbitant.
The case is not established on the ground of excessive
1
charges. But it is well known that the greater Sophists
were paid handsomely for the instruction which they im-
parted. However, regardless of the money received for
instruction, Zeller indicates that there are dangerous
possibilities in the practices followed by the Sophists.
In the first place, it is shown that the receiving of
fees naturally led to the exploitation of young men by
the Sophists, a practice that could not be regulated by
the State, and therefore liable to great abuse. This was
the more so because often as Plato shows, the Sophists
were not modest as to their abilities, especially with
respect to the services they pretended to render in fit-
ting young men for public life. It is notorious that
they guaranteed to fit their pupils to become better
citizens, more effective pleaders in the courts, and they
even prided themselves on their ability to malce the worse
appear the better reason. But young men are gullible,
and in the Greece of the Sophists they were no exception
to this general rule. Accordingly they were willing to
exchange their money for the promises made by these
popular teachers, and it is quite conceivable that they
frequently paid more for the services of the Sophists
than they were worth. But it is obvious that the buyer
Zeller
'
The Pre-Socratic Philosophy
. Vol 8, pp 436-445
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muat "beware even today and undoubtedly in that day the
motto, Caveat Emptor, applied with equal force.
And again, as Zeller points out, it is a dangerous
practice to place the maintenance of teachers directly in
the hands of the pupils whom they instruct. The modern
state has taken cognizance of this peril, and we may
pride ourselves on having developed an educational system
much more effective both from the standpoint of organiza-
tion and utility. Undoubtedly under the system in vogue
during the time of the Sophists there was temptation for
the master to say to the student the pleasant rather than
the true thing. But this is a practice by no means con-
fined to the Sophists and it scarcely seems fair that they
should receive our condemnation or criticism on this ground
alone. It would seem as if Plato had made too much of
this entire matter. The Sophists were in need of a live-
lihood, and they followed the profession of schoolmasters
with the zeal and enthusiasm of men who were anxious both
to make a living and a reputation for themselves. Plato's
view seems to be that of the aristocrat with the tradi-
tional disdain for paid labor of any sort.
Criticism of the Sophist epistemology.
It will be necessary in order to do justice to this part of
our study to present not only the arguments advanced by Plato
against the soundness of the Sophistic epistemology, but also
to call attention at some length to the fact that the Sophists
have not wanted for defenders and to oite at least some of the
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evidence presented on their behalf by modern historians and
philosophers, ^e shall first present the arguments in favor
of the Sophists as follows:
1 The defense of the Sophists' theory of knowledge by
Grote, Gomperz, and Schiller,
a The position of Grote is distinctly friendly to the
Sophists, He regards the Platonic opposition to
the Sophists as due to a radical difference between
his point of view and theirs. Plato had a great
zeal for theorizing, but also had a zeal for reform.
Compare the theory of the State, for example, as
developed in the Republic
1
with the actual historic
situation, and one gets an illustration of this two-
fold statement. But theory in the Sophists suffered
at the expense of practice. The Age of Pericles as
we have seen was one of ferment, of political and
economical expansion. The Athenian intellect needed
to make adjustment to an ever changing situation.
Facility rather than depth was requisite. It is for
this reason that Grote rates highly the importance
2
of the Sophists. Furthermore, the Sophists played
an important part in oalling attention to aspects
of philosophy neglected by the ^leatics. "hey con-
stituted an effective reply to the teachings of
3
Zeno and Parmenides.
1. Plato, The Republic
2. Grote, A History of Greece , Ch 67, p 395
3. Ibid, p~"3S5
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But the Sophists, Grote thinks, are to be commended, because
being confronted with a particular task in a difficult age, they
did it well. It was their business to qualify young men of abi-
lity for public life. They were not expected to work out elabor-
ate epistemological theories, nor have we a right to criticise
them because they failed at this point. It is this expectation
that has caused the Sophists to fall into disrepute, ^rankly
recognizing the limitations of the Sophists, Grote nevertheless
has a high regard for them. But he also recognizes the inevitable
opposition that was bound to grow between the Sophists and ""late.
It is the kind of opposition that we may expect when two vivid
and earnest views of the nature of human experience clash together,
b. The position of Gomperz. This writer agrees with
the general exposition of Protagoras that knowledge
is sense perception. But beyond this he is not will-
ing to trust the testimony of Plato as to what Pro-
tagoras really meant by it. He even accuses Plato of
attempting to derive from the teachings of Protagoras
statements neither really nor ostensibly uttered by
1
him. However, he admits that in all probability
Protagoras failed to distinguish between our percep-
2
tions and the conclusions drawn from them. He says
that Plato is actually speaking nonsense when he
3
accuses Protagoras of subjectivism. if Plato's
interpretation here is sound, Gomperz does not see
how Protagoras could have lived in Greek public life
4
for forty years with such high esteem and veneration.
1. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers
.
Vol 1, p 456
2. Ibid, p 4SS
3. Ibid, p 456
4. Ibid, p 456
i
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Let us apply, says Gomperz, the so called Homo mensura tenet to
Protagoras 1 statement respecting the gods. It will "be recalled
that he did not care to express an opinion here for reasons already
noted, viz; the obscurity of the subject and the shortness of life.
That is, his position was that of suspended judgment, agmosticism.
But Gomperz argues, if Protagoras had really been guilty of sub-
jectivism he would have said that for those who believe in gods,
there are gods, while for those who do not believe in gods, there
1
are no gods.
What Plato has done is really to pervert history. It is not
sufficient to consult Theaetetus only. Other sources, scanty though
they may be, should be searched. These will reveal, Gomperz, thinks,
that Protagoras was not a skeptic. The foregoing statement of the
case is characterized by great ability. It is deserving of ap-
praisal and reply. V/hat is the answer to Gomperz? First, it is
to be noted that he does admit the charge made against Protagoras
by Plato, viz -.-that knowledge is sense perception. And this is
really the gravamen of the charge made by Plato. It is not material
whether Protagoras was or was not a metaphysical skeptic. Nor is
it material that Plato may have had, as he likely did, abundance of
pre judices against Protagoras. It is not even material whether we
judge what Protagoras said by Theaetetus or by all the dialogues
in which he plays a part. If it is admitted that Protagoras did
identify knowledge with sense perception, and as we have seen,
Gomperz makes this admission, then the issue is clearly defined.
Is knowledge sense perception or is it something more? Tt is our
opinion that Gomperz does not squarely meet the situation here.
1. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers
,
Vol I p 457
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Again, Gomperz thinks that Protagoras could hardly have enjoyed
such public esteem over so long a period of time as indeed he did
and yet talk what seems to Gomperz nonsense. But surely this is
no new thing in history. 3ven in our age, the leaders of men en,1oy
oftentimes very great popularity and frequently talk: little else
than nonsense. There is very little weight to this argument, and
it should be dismissed. Finally, one does not have to be a Platonic
idealist in order to agree with his criticism of Protagoras. Tt is
after all a question of epistemology and not of metaphysics. Gom-
perz admits that Protagoras did not draw distinctions between sense
perceptions and our analysis of them. It was this failure that
made the position of Protagoras untenable. Self criticism would
have revealed this untenability to the great Sophist himself. Tt
is this gift of criticism that casts the balance in favor of Plato
as against Gomperz. For what is knowledge after all, but the
critical judgment of perception as good or bsd? And this is all
that is claimed for Plato here. It is the error of the defenders
of Protagoras to assume that because Plato himself constructed a
vulnerable system of metaphysics, his criticism of the Sophists
is therefore unsound. But we csnnot help but think that Plato
is fundamentally sound in his position.
c. The position of Schiller
Schiller ranks very high in promise and usefulness for
science, psychology and religion alike the dictum of Pro-
. tagoras that Man is the measure of all things.^"
1. Schiller, Studies in Humanism
, p 33
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The reason why this idea has failed to be of service in
philosophy is Plato 1 s unjust and false criticism. Schiller
argues for the reality of hallucinations, illusions, whims,
individual preferences, private judgments, etc. And he con-
tends that this acceptance does not carry with it a denial
of objective truth. He credits Protagoras with recognising
that it is the function of intelligence to alter reality with-
out and within. The difficulty with Plato, Schiller says,
is his eagerness to construct a criticism of Protagoras with-
out really investigating the logical and psychological cor-
rectness of what Protaproras said. He failed to understand
the great Humanist because he has an overwhelming contempt
1
for all empirical facts. Plato desired a conceptually
guaranteed world. He failed to recognize what Protagoras
clearly saw, the essentially instrumental nature of cog-
nition. For Plato the concept has finality. He
"deludes us into thinking that man was
made for the Ideas, to behold and con-
template them forever, and not Ideas
for man, to serve the ends of action."
Studies in Humanism, p 44
Plato rendered service and disservice in developing the
concept; service, in that he showed how percepts attained
stability through union in concepts; disservice, in that
he then proceeded to deny the reality of the percept and
2
claimed reality for the concept only. This led to his
subsequent hypostatization of ideas. The transformation
1. Ibid, pp 37-44
cr
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of the instrumental theory of ideas into a metaphysical one is
complete in the hands of ^lato. Consequently, the world of per-
ceived objects is held to "be unreal, and the world of Ideas is
held to be the world of truth. And thus we are presented in ex-
change for our so called unreal world of sense experience a
metaphysical world of Ideas, a world that is metaphysically One,
What is the remedy for the impasse to which ^lato has
brought philosophy? Schiller argues that we must really so back
to the doctrines of Protagoras and recognise afresh the function-
1
al and instrumental character of the concept. Only in this
was can we make provision for the growth of truth. Only in this
was can we avoid ultimate epistemological skepticism. This is
surely an able presentation of the case against Plato from the
point of view of modern Pragmatism. Put in answer to Schiller
we may say again that it is not necessery to endorse all that
Plato says to dissent from Protagoras. Let us grant at once
the reality of the percept. But the question is not as to its
reality but as to its truth. If, as Schiller says, Protagoras
2
himself made value judgments about percepts, is not this a
confession that something other than percepts is the standard
by which percepts are successively judged?
That is, reason sits in judgment on what the senses
present and thus judges of the falsity or truthful-
ness of what is perceived. Let it also be granted
that the concept is instrumental. Is not a large
part of its instrumentality its function of or-
ganizing experience on a coherent and intelligible
1. Ibid, pp 64 et seq,
2. Ibid, pp 166-168.
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basis? It is for such reasons as these that we must
consider Plato's judgment after all as decisive
against Protagoras notwithstanding the able and
brilliant defense of Protagoras by Schiller and
others,
2. The criticism of Plato as to the soundness of the Sophist
theory of knowledge and criterion of truth.
The classic discussion of the entire problem under consid-
eration is found in the Theaetetus. In this dialogue Socrates
says j
"I wonder that he (Protagoras) did not
begin his great work on Truth with a de-
claration that a pig or a dog faced baboon,
or some other stranger monster which has a
sensation is the measure of all things."
(Theaetetus, 162)
This statement is made in connection with the citation of the
doctrine of Protagoras that knowledge is perception. (Theae-
tetus 162). It is certainly Socrates' understanding that
Protagoras has in mind not man generically but individually.
And Schiller as we have seen seeks to justify the Sophist
position even in spite of the apparent relativity of the
criterion. That this interpretation of man as the individual
judge through his perceptions of what is true and what is
false is the true interpretation we may judfre from the actual
consequences which follow its use. To quote Plato again:
WA mender of old shoes or a patcher up of
clothes who made the shoes worse than when
he received them, could not have remained
thirty days undetected, and would very soon
have starved; whereas, during more than forty
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years Protagoras was corrupting his
disciples and sending them from him
worse than when he received them and
yet all Hellas failed in detecting
him." (Meno, 91)
and again:
"For if truth is only sensation and one
man's discernment is as good as another's,
and no man has any superior right to de-
termine whether the opinion of any other
is true or false, but each man, as we
have several times repeated, is to himself
the sole judge, and everything that he
judges is true, and rifrht, why should Pro-
tagoras be preferred to the place of wis-
dom and instruction and deserve to be well
paid and we poor ignoramuses have to go to
him, if each is the measure of his own
wisdom. " (Theaetetus 161)
Thus it would clearly seem that what Protagoras intends
is man as an individual, and by perception he means per-
ception on the part of the individual man.
But it is time to turn to the refutation and criti-
cism of the sense perception theory of knowledge and
truth.
a. If the theory of Protagoras is true, then it is
impossible to account for error and equally impos-
sible to establish with certainty any valid doctrine
of truth. Socrates is aware of this difficulty
and devotes his energies to the refutation of the
theory on these grounds. For example, he raises
the question of dreams and diseases of the mind
in addition to the problem that is raised by the
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illusions that are common both to hearing and
seeing. How are we to account for these
phenomena, if all our perceptions are true?
Thus he says:
"There still remains to be con-
sidered an objection which may be raised
about dreams and diseases, in particular
about madness and the various illusions
of sight and hearing. For you know that
in all these cases the theory of truth of
perception appears to be unmistakeably re-
futed, as in dreams and illusions we cer-
tainly have false perceptions and far from
saying that everything is which appears,
we shall rather say that nothing is which
appears."
(Theaetetus, 157-158)
In further exposition of this subjective infection
of the perception criterion, Socrates calls attention
to the difference that is commonly experienced in
the taste of wine in health or in illness. In the
first instance, it has a sweet or pleasant taste;
1
but in the second, it appears bitter and unpleasant.
And in summing up this part of his reply, Socrates
again says, this time in the Cratylus (384-386) that
there can be no distinction between wisdom and folly,
truth and error, if Protagoras is right. Certainly,
if Protagoras can carry his point, then what he says
is true, but perfectly meaningless, when he claims
that there is no such thing as falsehood, that a
1. Theaetetus, 159
4
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man mast either say what is true or say nothing.
b. The criterion is condemned because of its in-
adequacy from the point of view of practical usage.
This is the positive answer and the answer is made
so as to show the criterion to be totally inadequate
as a definition of knowledge or truth. For we see
that the state which is certainly interested in the
practical evaluation of theory rejects it completely.
It may be all very well for Protagoras or anybody
else to say that one man's opinion is as good as
another's, but in time of war, it is observed, the
state does not act on any such assumption; for it is
careful to select as commanders of armies men that ex-
2
eel others in the art of war. Knowledge, then, is
certainly something more than opinion even from a non-
philosophical point of view. Let us take one of the
senses, and see, for example, if knowledge is simply
seeing, to use the sense of sight for an illustration.
Seeing is certainly not knowledge, for if it were,
then non-seeing would be not-knowing, but we know that
a man having once seen an object remembers it, and of
course he still knows it when he no longer sees it*
Knowledge then certainly involves more than perception.
3
It involves memory, to say the least. The same is
1. Euthydemus, 286
2. Theaetetus, 17-171
3. Theaetetus, 163
r*
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true of hearing. No amount of hearing alone will enable
us to form knowledge of what we hear. We may listen ever
so often to a strange tongue and yet unless we learn the
meaning of the words which we hear we shall never know
1
the tongue that is spoken. Similarly, when we see
written letters, it takes something more than merely
2
seeing them to understand what is meant. And it is
significant that this point is admitted in the debate
with Socrates.
If knowledge then is something more than perception, what is the
something more that knowledge is? The answer is two fold:
1. Things themselves, although in relation to us, preserve
their own and proper essence throughout their relations.
That is, the things we know exist in their own right and do
not fluctuate according to our fancy, hut they are independent
and maintain their own essences in the relation prescribed
3
for them by Nature. This is the position of epistemological
dualism and constitutes a sound exposition of the independence
of the object in the knowledge relation.
2. While it is true that there is a sense in which all know-
ledge is relative, nevertheless, with due allowance made for
the relativity of knowledge produced by training, language,
logic, and the inherent limitations of capacity and ability
in the knower, it is still true that knowledge is objectively
valid. In short it does not follow that because there is some
relativity with which knowledge is infected, it is therefore
1. Theaetetus, 163
2. Theaetetus, 163
3. Cratylus, 386
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not objectively valid; for man uses his reason, ana it is the
reason that determines what is good and bad, true and false.
Reason is the final test as to the validity or invalidity of
truth. Knowledge is reflection on perception. This is the
conclusion of the Theaetetus, Protagoras failed because he
omitted the rational factor in experience and knowledge. Hera-
clitus could have taught him his error. Kant has since shown
that this is the cure for all subjectivity and skepticism,
when he tells us that
"Concepts without percepts are empty;
Percepts without concepts are blind."
Critique of "^ure "Reason.
Summary of the defects of the criterion of truth and theory of
knowledge as developed by the Sophists.
We may now indicate just what the difficulties of the Sophists
were and indicate the reasons for their failure to solve the
crucial problem of truth and of knowledge.
a. They were guilty of assuming that their doctrine covered
the whole problem of epistemology. Apparently the
phenomena of the senses are characterized by simplicity,
I see, hear, feel, smell, touch, taste, and therefore
what I experience through the senses is as it appears to
be. The apparent simplicity of the problem deceived the
Sophists, But it is not a cause for wonder, for it is
the naive realism of the common man. But the problem of
knowing has turned out to be. one of the most difficult
in the whole field of philosophy. And the Sophists were
((
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at a singular disadvantage, for they were pioneers in this
field and did not have the huge literature of modern times
on which to draw.
1
Their error lay in this assumption that
they constantly made, and that they did not have the tech-
nique or knowledge to correct.
b« Again, they were guilty of the error of superficiality.
Plato says that that only is decisive for the intellect
which is fundamental. The Athenian intellect, as Pater has
shown, and in particular, the intellect of the Sophists,
was discursive. The intellect that is discursive is likely
to need the kind of control that Plato sought to impose
upon it. The Sophists were interested in lare-e educational
programmes; they stressed variety rather than depth. It is
the merit of Plato that he subjected the Sophist intellect
to such searching criticism as appears in the dialos*ues.
What was needed was direction and restraint. This Plato
2
indicated.
c. In the third place, because of the preceding consider-
ations, it may be noted that the Sophists sought to do
philosophical business with an inadequate epistemoloe-ical
equipment. Sven granted that Plato may be accused of ex-
cessive intellectuality, his criticism of the Sophists at
this point is essentially sound. In the Republic (Book- 1)
he attempts to get a definition of justice, a definition
1. Macintosh, The Problem of Knowledge . See this volume for
a detailed treatment of the history of epis temology.
2, Pater, Plato and platonism. pp 99 to 127.
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which will work:, and one which at the same time must satisfy
the intellect. He could not accomplish this "by measuring
one relative by another, as did the Sophists, for this was
to measure the phenomena of the senses by the senses them-
selves and to argue in a vicious circle. There was bound to
be antagonism between Plato and the Sophists on this ground
alone. For the ambiguity of the criterion is at once ap-
parent. Is it the lower or the higher part of man that is
to be the judge of truth? There was failure to distinguish
between perception, Judgment and conception, "he result is
a theory of knowledge which is either sensational or rela-
tivistic. And this we have shown to be inadequate as a
criterion of truth.
Criticism of the Ethics of the Sophists.
1. Criticism of the Sophists on the ground of their
Ethical Relativism:
If the teachings of the Sophists as these bear upon
conduct, are derived from their theory of knowledge,
Sophistic ethics is committed to Relativism. Possibly
this accounts for men like Prodicus spending his time on
matters quite irrelevant to ethics. mhis Sophist, if we
may believe Plato, spent his time in endless distinctions
as to the meaning of words. Socrates says:
"If I had not been poor, I might have
heard the fifty drachmae reading of the
great Prodicus which is a complete edu-
cation in grammar and language."
Cratylus, 394.
f(
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In the Laches (197) there is an argument going on as to
the nature of courage, and here again ^rodicus is charged
with spending too much time in talcing words to pieces,
instead of getting at the meaning of courage. It is evi-
dent that Prodicus' chief interest lay in the distinction
of terms. And undoubtedly he rendered estimable service
to knowledge in this respect, hut it still remains that
words rather than ideas consumed his energy and time.
Such views as are attributed to him are pessimistic in
nature. In his treatise, Hercules at the Cross Roads, a
part of a lost work called The Seasons, he advocated the
use of strength and force, coupled with the gospel of
seeking salvation through a manly life, simple manners
and plain living.
That the Sophists regarded the senses as the sources
of our ideas of right and wrong is also evidenced by the
Protagoras. The subject of the dialogue is Virtue. And
the question is asked whether the virtues are one or
many? Socrates attempts to show that virtue is knowledge,
and that virtue can be taught, but that it is rational
rather than sensational in nature. Callicles maintained
that pleasure is the supreme good, that pain is evil,
that the rule of the stronger or the better is justified.
But as usual there is no attempt on the part of the Sophist
disputant to define terms. !7hat is meant by the stronger?
Socrates says it can have no rational meaning unless by
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the stronger is meant the better. Again, Collides con-
tends that to have all desires and to satisfy them is to
possess happiness, as to be hungry and always eating, to
be thirsting and always drinking, and Socrates replies
ironically:
"And to be itching and always scratching."
*
And this is just as sensible a definition as any the
Sophists advanced. It is from notices of this sort that
we infer the carrying over into the field of ethics of
the theory of knowledge advanced by Protagoras. It is
true that Socrates himself does not elaborate a complete
theory of ethics, but at least he does offer a sound
criticism of the position advanced by the Sophists that
pleasure, unanalysed, or pain or any other emotion con-
stitutes what is good or bad. The difficulty here is
that there is no permanent basis for morals.
D. Criticism of the metaphysics of the Sophists.
Little that is authoritative can be said here. The
references in Plato are far from abundant. However, Pro-
tagoras himself is quoted as inclining to Agnosticism for
reasons already referred to. His reason that the subject
of the gods is involved in too much obscurity is not suf-
ficient ground however for his Agnosticism. It is to be
expected that the subject matter of metaphysics will be
1. Plato, Protagoras * The dialogue is an interesting comment
on the "Sophist and the Platonic way of thinking.
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difficult. The real reason for the failure of the Sophists
to accomplish any metaphysical task lies rather in their
thoroughly Humanistic bias. The very limitations of the
interests of the Sophists made impossible any metaphysical
investigations. Kant has shown that a mere empirical phil-
osophy will not serve the purposes of metaphysics in his
keen criticism of Hume. And this same remark: may be applied
to Protagoras or to any other Sophist. It is true that
human intelligence in Greece at the time when the Sophists
were flourishing was absorbed in political problems, but
even this age produced a Plato, And the significance of
this remark lies in the fact that where men are willing to
build a philosophic world view, they do so by the use of
the rational powers of the mind. Plato is a noble instance
of this possibility. On the other hand, it is equally sig-
nificant that schools of thought that neglect the rational
approach to all problems arrive either at Agnosticism or
Naturalism. The thoroughgoing Humanist is averse to meta-
physics and it is here that the defect of the Sophists takes
its rise*
IV. Summary and statement of the contributions of the Sophists to
Philosophy.
1. In justice to the Sophists it needs to be said that
their defects lie in the serious limitations of the know-
ledge of their time. With fuller scientific knowledge and
with instruments, they would have been apprised of their
•
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errors and thus would have had opportunity to correct their
views. That things are not what they appear to he is the
verdict of modern physics. The theories of the electron, of
ether waves, of radio activity, of elements, etc., as revealed
to us by modern science, have shown "beyond a doubt that appear-
ances do not constitute or exhaust reality.'*" But this fuller
knowledge is ours not only because of the growth of concepts,
but also because of the invention and use of instruments by
means of which we have been able to make a scientific investi-
gation of Nature. This advantage the Sophists did not possess.
Furthermore, modern psychology has shown us that the act
of perception is greatly complicated and not at all the simple
process supposed by the Sophists. It remained for modern
science to elaborate the insights that have come to us regard-
ing the relation of stimulus and response; the mechanism of
the perceptive process, and the acquisition of knowledge
through general psychological and logical processes. And
modern philosophy, operating through scientific logic has
shown us that the mind is active in perception and contributes
to the process of knowledge. Without that active co-operation
of the mind, there can be no knowledge . Since the time of
Kant we have discovered that knowledge is not the passive
affair supposed by the empiricists of Greece or Europe,
whether they be Protagoras and ^orgias on the one hand, or
Eerkeley and Hume on the other. Even the modern system that
1. Brightman, Introduction to Philosophy
.
Ch 4.
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has most affiliations with the Sophists, Pragmatism and the
New Instruraentalism pays its tribute to rationalism in so
far as it adds analysis and the selective function of con-
sciousness to the perceptions of the senses. But notwith-
standing all that we may rightly say in criticism of the
Sophists, the fact remains that they too made their contri-
bution to the history of philosophic thought by showing that
experience must always be the subject matter of philosophy.
It was because of this fact that they formed the link be-
tween the Nature philosophers and the Age of Socrates and
Plato, And without them the brilliant work: of these masters
would have been impossible. The complete development of
modern thought, as well as that of the ancient Greece, owes
much of its success to the impetus first given by the
Sophists. And we may well say in closing this part of our
discussion that without these philosophy would not have been
made perfect. We see now as Sir William Hamilton so splen-
didly said:
"There is nothing arreat in the world but man.
There is nothing great in man but mind."
And we may even quote the stanza attributed to Dr. Watts
(1674-1742) with due allowance for his eighteenth century
terminology:
"Were I so tall to reach the pole.
Or grasp the ocean with my span,
I must be measured by my soul;
The mind's the standard of the man."
e
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PART TWO: THE PRAGIIATIS^S
The Pragmatists
>
The rise of Pragmatism as a method in philosophy is one of
the significant movements in modern thought. It is essentially
a Western philosophy, and has all the characteristics of the
practical emphases associated with a civilization rich in
material achievements. Moreover, it is closely associated with
the practical results of the applied sciences. Accordingly we
may expect of Pragmatism that it will be quite impatient of
theory and abstraction in philosophy, and in its eagerness for
practical values in life will make metaphysics secondary. It
is this modern attempt to create a philosophical viewpoint,
with its emphasis on consequences, results, cash values, satis-
factory adjustments in experience that eroes under the name of
Pragmatism or in some of its forms, Instrumental ism.
We cannot understand Progmatism without reference to the
inductive sciences out of which it has arisen. Essentially a
modern view point, it cannot be appraised without considering
its connection with the scientific background to which it owes
its greatest affiliations. And this involves some retrospective
glance at the course of intellectual development that marks the
progress of modern civilization. A starting point for this
review in any event will be somewhat arbitrary, for any date
that may be selected will depend largely on the interest to be
served. Accordingly as the interest here is primarily philo-
r(
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sophical, it will be well to indicate as the beginning of the
modern view point in science and philosophy the age in which
Bacon styled himself as the herald and trumpeter of a new
time. Francis Bacon (1561-1626) outlined his opposition to
Aristotle and the Schoolmen in his epoch making book, The Ad-
vancement of Learning. He was thoroughly impatient of the out-
worn methods of deduction in logic, claiming that these methods
made men like unto spiders forever weaving webs from their own
bodies. What was wanted was a procedure that would actually
increase the sum total of human knowledge, and this deduction
never could do. In this connection Bacon constructed his famous
tables in which he set forth some of the steps in a true in-
ductive logic. The significant fact is not the tables them-
selves, but the fact that they are the first promise and begin-
ning of the logic of science, a logic that finds notable ex-
pression in the work of John Stuart Mill. Bacon is by no means
the most important figure of the new movement, for just as there
were brave men before Agamemnon so there were more industrious
and famous advocates of the method of induction. But the voice
of Bacon is that of philosophy speaking its need of a new
approach to the facts of experience, end in so far as he does
this. Bacon is the progenitor of the great empirical tradition
that has characterized modern English and American philosophy.
To think of Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Mill is to think
of them as belonging in the same line of empirical approach
t
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to philosophy as Bacon. It is appropriate therefore that we
begin the approach to Pragmatism with reference to the in-
evitable conflict that induction precipitated between the old
and the new points of view in science, philosophy and religion.
For, it is significant, that as the authoritarian prin-
ciple in the realms of knowledge has broken down, the methods
of the inductive sciences have become increasingly fruitful
and prosperous. Once admitted as a principle of investigation,
the logic of results compelled an ever widening application
of the method to succeeding fields of knowledge. Hence we
have seen the spreading of this method until today no field
of experience is exempt from its application. In the phy-
sical and natural sciences, in the fields of history and
sociology, the disciplines of philosophy and religion alike,
the principle of induction has come to be sovereign. mhere
is no realm of inquiry left in which the inductive methods are
not recognized as necessary and as inevitable. And so, to
neglect the importance of procedure that is well nigh uni-
versal, would be to argue oneself either careless or ignorant
of the most radical change that has come over the attitudes
of men in relation to the problems of the modern world, ^e
are manifestly alive in a world of new discoveries, all of
which are traceable to the steadfast and unflinching methods
of induction. Physics, Chemistry, Biology and a host of other
disciplines are eloquent witnesses that the old deductive order
c
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has been replaced "by a new one based on induction as a tried and
proved method in the acquisition of new and dependable know-
ledge.
It is not then a source of wonder that philosophy should
also be infected with the inductive fever. Hence, we are not
surprised to see stout advocates of the empirical school aris-
ing to give battle to systems of thought based upon the premises
of rationalism and deduction. In Great Britain, Locke, "Berke-
ley and Hume are the protagonists of the newer approach to
the problem of thought, and from these men have descended a
host of thinkers reared in the empirical tradition. Among the
most popular and widespread of the empirical philosophies of
modern times is Pragmatism. This philosophical approach to
thought and life is thoroughly modern, and finis itself at
utter variance with all forms of rationalistic philosophy, and
in particular, has delivered its broadsides against Absolute
Idea] ism, the stoutest of the philosophies with rationalistic
premises. Perhaps Pragmatism has been especially vicious with
Absolute Idealism because Pragmatism regards it as the out-
standing type of what it calls vicious intellectualism.
It is regarded as being of all rationalistic philoso-
phies the one that is most aloof from the facts of experience,
as being too thoroughly rationalistic, a priori, speculative,
and wholly inadequate as an interpreter of hum^n experience.
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And inasmuch as Pragmatism desires above all things to
bring philosophy into closer relations with life, to make
it fruitful for living as well as for thinking, we can
easily understand why Pragmatism selects Absolute Idealism
as the target for its empirical attacks. It will be profit-
able, then, to trace in some detail the teachings of Prag-
matism in order to make a comparison later with its ancient
empirical counterpart, the Relativism of the Sophists.
A. The Origin and development of Pragmatism: its chief
representatives.
1. The Origin of Pragmatism. Charles ^eirce, the
Pounder.
The originator of the systematic application of the
newer way of looking at the problems of philosophy was
Charles Peirce. This thinker set forth the characteristic
method of Pragmatism in a paper first published in the
Popular Science Monthly for January, 1878. mhe title,
"How to Make Our Ideas Clear" is at once suggestive of
the dissatisfaction that was felt by him as to the exist-
ting criteria of logic. It is of great importance that we
understand the reasons for this dissatisfaction and that
we obtain a clear knowledge of the suggestions made for
making our ideas clear. Descartes, he says, has told us
c
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what clearness implies. But what is wanted is a method
by which our ideas can "be made clear. Let us examine the
method of Peiroe with reference to its bearing on Pragmatism.
First, he tells us that logicians have generally made the
mistake of stating the nature of clear ideas instead of in-
forming us just how our ideas should be made clear, "hus
they say:
"A clear idea is defined as one which is
so apprehended that it will be recog-
nized wherever it is met with, and so
that no other will be mistaken for it.
It it fails of this clearness, it is
said to be obscure. "1
This
,
says Peirce, is a neat bit of terminology, but it
has no logical value, since the important thing is to make
our ideas clear and not to define what clearness is. As
the classic example of this common error he cites Descsrtes,
showing that this philosopher after having rejected the
scholastic principle of authority, turned to self conscious-
ness and held that whatever was clear here was true. Put
Descartes failed to distinguish between what was actually
clear and what seemed so. ?rue, Descartes added also the
test of distinctness, i.e., that ideas should be able to
survive the test of dialectical examination. Put Pefrce
Indicates and rightly that this test fails to show, what
is really essential, namely, how we should make our ideas
clear. To quote him again directly:
1. C. Peirce, Chance. Love & Logic
, p 52.
f
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"The very first lesson that we have a right
to demand that logic shall teach us is t how
to make our ideas clear; and an important
one it is, depreciated only "by minds who
stand in need of it." 1
He is very emphatic here and goes on to commiserate the man
who cannot think clearly.
"It is terrible to see how a single unclear
idea, a single formula without meaning,
lurking in a young man's head, will some-
times act like an obstruction of inert
matter in an artery, hindering the nutrition
of the "brain, and condemning its victim to
pine away in the fullness of his intellec-
tual vigor and in the midst of intellectual
plenty." 2
The thesis of Peirce demands that he himself show us
how to attain clear ideas. This can be done only by recog-
nizing the principle already laid down, that the function of
thought is to produce fixation of belief. Here emerges the
note that has become so familiar in the literature of ^reer-
matism, namely, instrumentality of thought, thought is ex-
cited by the irritation of doubt. It does not cease until
belief has become fixed. But what is belief? Poetically,
Peirce replies: "It is the demi-cadence which closes a mUSi-
Cl
cal phrase in the symphony of our intellectual life." Put
his analysis shows quite clearly his meaning. Belief con-
sists of three properties: first, it is something that we
are aware of; second, it appeases the irritation of doubt;
1. Peirce, Chance. Love ft Logic
, p 36
2. Ibid, p 37
3. Ibid, p 41
t T .
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and third, it involves the establishment in our nature of a
rule of action, in short, a habit. The only function of
thought is the establishing of habits of action. And so he
gives his rule for that attainment of clearness as to our
ideas. This rule he claims to have finality.
"Consider what effects, which might conceivably
have practical bearings, we conceive the ob-
ject of our conception to have, "hen our con-
ception of these effects is the whole of our
conception of the object." 1
As an illustration of this principle, attention is called
to the theological dispute between Protestant and Roman
Catholic as to the nature of the elements in the sacrament.
Prom the point of view of loeric there is no practical dif-
ference between Transubstantiation and Consubstantiation.
Whether we regard the bread and wine of the sacrament to be
actually the body and blood of Christ or simply symbolic of
these things, there is no ultimate difference in our mean-
ing, if in both Protestant and Romanist the same effect is
produced. Other illustrations are used by "^eirce to make
his meaning clear. Thus, for example, when we discuss
diamonds or other material substances, there can be no
essential manner or understanding of what is meant by hard-
ness or softness in each particular case as long as these
substances are not brought to the test. Likewise again
1. Peirce, Chance, Love and Logic
, p 45
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with reference to what is meant by lighter or heavier, there
is no possibility of judgment apart from the test of exper-
ience. Finally, says Peirce in this same connection:
"Consequently if we know what the effects of force
are, we are acquainted with every fact which is
implied in saying that a force exists, and there
is nothing more to know." 1
Here then is the first enunciation of the doctrine of
truth since made so familiar by Pragmatists. As Peirce puts
it, we have clear ideas about any object of thouerht when we
know the effects of the object upon us. It is the general-
ization and application of this principle that has become
so intimately associated with Pragmatism. To know what is
true or false, let us put things to the test. Tith the
announcement of this principle, Peirce seems to have been
content, and we must turn to later Pragmatists for the wider
application of the principle laid down by the founder of the
movement. Before we do so, however, there is another great
contribution to Pragmatism that Peirce has made, and this we
must now consider.
It has already been made clear that consequences play
an important role in the determination of knowledge. Peirce
goes on to build a logical platform for conduct, by showing
us that we can never dissociate consequences from our ulti-
mate thought or action, but that on the other hand we can
1. C. Peirce, Chance. Love and Logic
, p 52
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never be wholly individualistic in our views with reference to
either the probability or certainty of consequences as the
) guide for our actions. This doctrine which "Peirce outlines
in his paper. The Doctrine of Chances, is the genesis of the
social emphasis that is later found in Dewey and as such is
of importance in fully assessing the influence and teacher of
the celebrated founder of Pragmatism.
Taking his cue from the inductive sciences, and particu-
larly from the use of mathematics in arriving at probabilities,
as for example, in the case of insurance companies which have
figured the normal expectancy of human life at any £iven age,
by means of the statistical study of averages, he calls atten-
tion to what seems to be a most important fact in human ex-
perience :
"All human affairs rest upon probabilities,
and the same thing is true everywhere. If
man were immortal he could be perfectly sure
of seeing the day when everything in which
he had trusted should betray his trust, and,
in short, of coming eventually to hopeless
misery. He would break down, at last, as
every good fortune, as every dynasty, as
every civilization does. In place of this
we have death." 1
It is the certainty of death that makes our risfes,.
\ our inferences, finite, and so lessens their uncertainty as
to results. Hence it follows that while probability is a
justifiable guide in human affairs, there is no real logicality
1* C. Peirce, Chance, Love and Logic
, p 72
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to this kind of probability, if it simply be personal and
individual. And so we cannot stop with the calculation of
chances or the drawing of inferences as to probabilities or
consequences in our own cases alone. For as ""eirce says
further:
"Logicality inexorably requires that our interests
shall not be limited. They must not stop at our
own fate, but must embrace the whole community.
This community, again, must not be limited, but
must extend to all races of beings with whom we
can come into immediate or mediate intellectual
relation He who would not sacrifice his
own soul to save the whole world, is, as it seems
to me, illogical in all his inferences, collect-
ively. Logic is rooted in the social principles." 1
There are many striking illustrations of what Peirce has
in mind. And no doctrine of consequences can ever neglect
the social implications here laid down. Hen will die for the
spirit of the regiment, for the love of home and country only
when they do identify themselves with a community of interests
larger than their own. And so what seems to be perfectly
suicidal when looked at in the light of one's individual
interests becomes perfectly heroic when looked at from the
wider vantage ground of common interest and devotion. And
further, an enterprise that is foredoomed to be destructive
of the individual's interests, yea, evenof his own life, still
has value when looked at from the point of view of consequences
wider than those that merely affect the individual life. mhat
1. Peirce, Chance. Love and Logic
, p 73
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is to say, that only those inferences which are based upon the
supposition of the permanence of interests wider than our own are
truly logical. Thus to quote Peirce again:
"The soldier who runs to scale a wall
knows that he will probably be shot,
but that is not all he cares for. He
also knows that if all the regiment,
with whom he in feeling identifies him-
self, rush forward at once, the fort
will be taken." 1
Success of enterprise can be predicated only in the long
run. It is only as we keep universal interests and values in
mind that we are truly logical. Socrates and Christ alike seem
perfectly foolish to their own generation, but their conduct has
the highest logic, if we consider the influence generated for un-
selfishness in thought and action by their conduct. Shelley has
caught a glimpse of this same vision in that fine passage, begin-
ning:
"The many pass, the one abides.
And life like a dome of many colored glass.
Stains the white radiance of Eternity."2
This thought finds its climax in the summary Peirce himself makes,
a statement that places Pragmatism clearly beyond the charge of
selfishness that might easily be associated with it. Inasmuch as
the community may last beyond any assignable date on the doctrine
of probabilities, we are urged to recognize the importance of,
(a) Having an interest in an indefinite community, (b) Recognizing
1. Peirce, Chance. Love and Logic , p 74.
2. SHelley. Adonals
. p 52.
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the possibility that this interest may ultimately achieve
supremacy, (c) Hoping in the unlimited continuance of intellectual
activity as the indispensable requirement of logic.
Thus we have in outline a statement of the primitive or
early Pragmatism from a writer who is quoted by later Pragmatists
as its founder and inspirer. Viewed from the point of view of
Peirce, Pragmatism is clearly a method in philosophy that deals
with consequences* These count for more than anything else in
philosophy, Further, we have also seen that when Peirce speaks
of consequences, he does not have in mind those which are merely
individual, but the consequences and interests of a community
much wider than our own. Thus at its first appearance Pragmatism
appears as a champion of general and social, rather than immediate
and personal interests, and in fairness to the movement this early
emphasis should be clearly noted. In some cases as we shall see
the thought of immediacy has become over emphasised, but in the
case of Peirce there was not this emphasis as has already been
shown. Peirce is manifestly personalis tic and intellectualistic
in his reading of philosophy. There is abundant opportunity for
the individual as a reflective being to judge for himself Just
what the really logical procedure is in human experience. Pure
individualism is doomed and in its place only the truly social
and community enterprise has a chance of success. Much of
pragmatism today has lost sight of this principle, but clearly
1. Peirce, Chance. Love and Logic
, p 75
r(
r
-61-
Peiree himself has the larger vision of what is logically
necessary to success in philosophic thought. Thus he escapes
the subjectivism of many pragmatists, and lays the foundation
for the work of James, to whom we must now turn.
2. The development of Pragmatism in America: William James and
John Dewey.
William James (1842-1910) was born in Hew York; was educated
in private schools in America and France. He received a degree
in medicine from Harvard in 1870. His subsequent career was
bound up with his alma mater as a professor successively of
anatomy, physiology, psychology and philosophy, until his death
in 1910.
James was a prolific writer, but it was The Principles of
Psychology (1890) which gave him outstanding eminence on two
continents. For our purpose, however, it is the books on phil-
osophy which are of greatest interest. These books were pub-
lished subsequent to 1900. First in 1897 appeared The Will
to Believe, a series of essays on subjects of philosophic and
religious importance. By far the most famous of these is the
one for which the volume is named. In 1902 appeared The
Varieties of Religious Experience, still a classio in the field
of psychology of religion. Pragmatism was published in 1907;
A Pluralistic Universe in 1909, and The Meaning of Truth in the
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same year. Published posthumously were two books. The Prob-
lems of Philosophy, apparently an unfinished volume on Intro-
duction to Philosophy, (1911), and Essays in Radical Empiri-
cism (1912)
With the above brief biographical and bibliographical
sketch we must here be content, for our chief interest lies in
the exposition of Pragmatism as it has developed into the teach
ings of this great mind.
First, then, let us consider Pragmatism as taught by James
the popular expositor for philosophical and non-philosophical
minds alike of Pragmatism. Naturally we expect to find in a
psychologist as famous as James the approach to Pragmatism
from the point of view of psychology. Accordingly, we are not
disappointed, and James's rendering of Pragmatism may proper-
ly be called psychological, in contrast, as we shall see later,
to the logical Pragmatism of Dewey and the Chicago School.
Peiroe had called his teaching pragmaticism. But this
title was destined to be modified by James so that it would
have the form which has now become historic, namely, Pragma-
tism. The Cambridge philosopher in setting forth what he means
by Pragmatism, cites the etymology of the word and indicates
its derivation from the same Greek word, from which our English
word, practical, practice, is derived. The principle involved
in Pragmatism is taken bodily from Peirce, and is phrased by
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James as followB:
"To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts
of an object, then, we need only to consider
what conceivable effects of a practical kind
the object may involve—what sensations we
are to expect from it, and what reactions we
must prepare. Our conception of these effects,
whether immediate or remote, is then for us
the whole of our conception of the object, so
far as that conception has positive signi-
In stating what is meant by Pragmatism, James calls at-
tention to the fact that for almost twenty years the principle
underlying the philosophy of Peirce had lain unnoticed, and
that he (James) was the first to call attention to it. Let us
see what kind of exposition of Pragmatism James affords.
Before we can do thi8, however, it is necessary that we
obtain an insight into the general conception of James as to
the nature of philosophic thought. His starting point is that
there is an inseparable connection between psychology and phil-
osophy. Philosophy indeed is rooted in human psychology. Try
to deny this as we will, we are finally forced to admit that
every man comes to the discussion of philosophical problems
loaded with the bias of his own particular temperament. Says
James:
ficance at all."
"The history of philosophy is to a great extent
that of a certain clash of human temperaments.
1. James, Pragmatism , pp 46-47
2. James, Pragmatism
, p 61
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Philosophers may pretend to sink the fact of temperament
when engaged in philosophical discussion, but the bias of
temperament is there constantly. It is this bottom fact
which determines the kind of attitude we take finally toward
the universe. Rationalist and empiricist alike are influenced
by temperament. Such thinkers as Plato, Locke, Hume and Spencer
afford us illustrations of the power of temperament in deter-
mining our philosophical reactions to the world. And James
insists on the need of recognizing this fundamental fact at
the outset in philosophy. Indeed, says he:
"The one thing that has counted so far in
philosophy is that a man should see things,
see them straight in his own peculiar way,
and be dissatisfied with any opposite way
of seeing them."l
In fact, the whole history of human experience, whether in
art, literature, manners, government or philosophy furnishes
abundant evidence of the recognition of the fact that temper-
ament does determine largely our permanent attitude toward
the problems of these departments of human life. Just as we
have romanticists and realists in literature, so we find in
philosophy rationalists and empiricists. Rationalists are
characterized by their devotion to principles; empiricists,
by their devotion to facts. It is the merit of Pragmatism
1. Ibid, pp 8,9.
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that it frankly recognizes the divisions made by temperament
in philosophical and other points of view. Philosophy for
the most part, James holds, has affected ignorance of this
fundamental premise. Pragmatism not only recognizes its
importance, but boldly states that it stands for the empirical
attitude in philosophy. The fact of temperament in philosophy
is so strongly emphasized by James that we ought to indicate
in detail the position of this thinker with reference to its
importance. Thinkers are empirical or tough-minded and
rationalistic or tender-minded; their characteristics are
summarized as follows:
Tender-minded Tough-minded
(Rationalistic, going by principles) (Empiricist, going by fact
In this now famous table of contrasts, James brings out
fully what he means by the importance of temperament in phil-
osophy. Pragmatism is empirical, hungry for facts and then
more facts, but it is not indifferent to principles. Hereto-
fore we have been constrained to accept at the hands of pro-
fessional philosophers rationalism with its disdain for facts
Inte lie ctuali sti c
Idealistic
Optimistio
Religious
Free-willist
Monistic
Dogmatical
Sensational! stic
Materialistic
Pessimistic
Irreligi ous
Fatalistic
Pluralistic
Skeptical
1
1. James, Pragmatism
, p 12
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or empiricism, with its disregard of principles. But as James
says, most of us are hungry for the better things on both sides
of the line. We want the consolations of religion along with
the fact 8 of experience, and it is the purpose of Pragmatism to
satisfy this fundamental demand of our natures.
a* The definition of Pragmatism. James on the meaning of
Pragmatism.
It is quite significant that James does not give us any
set definition of Pragmatism, although he devotes much space to
telling us what Pragmatism is. He assures tis that there is
nothing especially new in Pragmatism as a method of philosophy.
Great philosophers like Socrates, Aristotle, Locke, Berkeley and
Hume were adepts in the pragmatic method and made momentous con-
tributions to it. However, these men, great as they were, were
simply forerunners of the kingdom, and it remained for James
and the nineteenth and twentieth century Pragmatists to give us in
all its fullness the exposition of Pragmatism as a contemporary
philosophy. We are told that Pragmatism is a temper, an attitude,
a method. It is the empiricist temper and attitude. As James
puts it:
"A pragmatist turns his back resolutely and once
for all upon a lot of inveterate habits dear to
professional philosophers. He turns away from
abstraction and insuff iciency from verbal solu-
tions, from bad a priori persons, from fixed
principles, closed systems, and pretended abso-
lutes and origins. He turns toward concreteness
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and adequacy, towards, facts, towards action
and towards power. That means the empiricist
temper regnant and the rationalist temper
sincerely given up. It means the open air
and possibilities of nature, as against dogma,
artificiality, and the pretence of finality
in truth. "1
At the same time there is no claim to special results accru-
ing from Pragmatism. It is a method only. It is, according
to James, primarily a method of settling metaphysical dis-
putes which would otherwise be interminable. It is a method
that is interested in concrete results for life, in the
achievement of satisfactory consequences, in the translation
of philosophical problems into cash values. The assumption of
James is, borrowing directly from Peirce, that things, pro-
blems, events are vital accordingly as they have practical
consequences for us and for reality , To use his own language:
"The whole function of philosophy ought to be
to find out what definite difference it will
make to you and me, at definite instants of
our life, if this world-formula or that
world-formula be the true one." 2
Theories, then, should not be considered as answers to riddles,
but as instruments for the solution of problems. The whole on-
set of Pragnatism considered methodologically, is toward the
achievement of last things, fruits, consequences, facts. Prag-
matism, then, may be defined, as
HThe attitude of looking away from first
things, principles, categories, supposed
necessities; and of looking towards last
1. James, Pragmatism, p 51
2. Ibid

-68-
things, fruits, consequence 8, facts."1
With the above general statements in mind, it will be well
for us to review the situation in philosophy that is respon-
sible for the rise of this new method called Pragmatism.
b. The causes underlying the rise of Pragmatism: the
inadequacy of rationalistic systems of thought.
Much of James's advocacy of Pragmatism derives its force
from the criticism that appears in his writings of rational-
istic systems of philosophy generally and of Absolute Idealism
in particular. It is his revolt from rationalism as being out
of harmony with human experience that is the moving cause in
his enunciation of his pragmatic teaching. Let us see what
the factors in rationalism are against which he lifts his
voice.
Rationalism, intellect uariism, that is, the attitude in
philosophy which starts from wholes or universals, stressing
unity as fundamental both in the universe and our intellectual
appraisal of it, is the way of looking at things that seems
to be especially vicious to James. This is called by him
"vicious intellectualism" because it appears to take too much
account of system, consistency, absoluteness, and on the other
hand, too little account of the individual facts of experience.
Particular experiences, he thinks, are altogether obnoxious
1. James, Pragmatism
, pp 54-55
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to the rationalistic type of mind. In fact, rationalism is
an escape from facts rather than interpretation of them:
"It is.... a classic sanctuary in which the
rationalist fancy may take reftige from
the intolerably confused and Gothio
character which mere facts present. It is
no explanation of our concrete universe,
it is another thing altogether, a sub-
stitute for it, a remedy, a way of escape." 1
It is furthermore too refined a way of looking at problems.
Refinement characterizes our intellectualist philosophies,
James tells us. But who that looks abroad upon the world of
experience will use this adjective as being descriptive of it?
It is for this reason that practical men and men of a scienti-
fic turn of mind turn away from metaphysics in ill concealed
disgust. But rationalistic refinement can never satisfy the
empiricist temper. And James accuses it of artificiality, and
as being utterly alien from the world of facts. Leibnitz is
the classic example of the horror which the rationalistic phil-
osopher excites in the mind of the Pragmatist. In the Theodicee
of Leibnitz is portrayed the essential fitness of the divine
Justice in punishing souls eternally for their earthly sins.
James accuses the German philosopher in caustic language of
having never visualized the meaning of a damned soul, of having
too feeble a grasp of the meaning of this problem for reality,
of the superficiality that characterizes a rationalism that
1. James, Pragmatism
, p 22
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starts with intellectual abstractions and takes no account of
their meaning for concrete existences.
It is an intensely emotional reaction that inspires
the denunciation of rationalism in James's attack on Leibnitz.
It is a criticism of what Pragmatism regards as the wholesale
pessimism of rationalism. Another criticism, this time
directed at the equally wholesale optimism of rationalism is
found in James's summary of the case of Corcoran, a Cleveland
workingman, who had committed suicide because of unemployment
and impending starvation for his family and himself. It is
a criticism of a shallow optimism based upon too much concern
for consistency of intellectual attitude and too little for
the value of human interests. Bradley says:
"The Absolute is richer for every discord
and for all the diversity which it embraces. wl
But it is the present individual, human discord and suffering
that appeals to the concrete mind of James. He is more con-
cerned with the fortunes of men than the state of affairs as
touching the Absolute. It is this concern for the integrity
of the universe at the expense of human experience that con-
stitutes the rationalistic refinement so abhorrent to the mind
of James. Absolute Idealism, the form of rationalism against
which James shows most animus, is abstract, noble, in the
aristocratic sense and remote, and is all this at the expense
1. F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality
, p 204.
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of facts, concrete situations, human values* It will be well,
therefore, to analyze James's objections to this form of ra-
tionalism as being the most significant of the philosophical
causes giving rise to Pragmatism.
Criticism of Absolute Idealism by James,
Absolute Idealism is the philosophical doctrine that the
ground of things is perfect and eternally complete. It is the
Hegelian concept of the world as One Absolute Self that is
attacked by James. This is that extreme form of rationalism
which goes under the name of Absolute Idealism.
a. The outstanding criticism of Absolute Idealism is that it
consists largely of speculative dogma. It is one of the great
unproved assumptions. Moreover, its magnetic character is due
to its tremendous emotional appeal. The vision of the cosmic
unity is alluring. The mind naturally desires wholeness,
integrity, completeness in its concepts, and this Absolute Ideal-
ism furnishes to thought. However, James says, it is character-
ized by emotional abstractness, and because it carries with it
a feeling of majesty and nobleness, it appeals to the specu-
lative instincts of the mind. But the difficulty is that in
stressing Unity, we lose sight of Plurality. In fact, unity
is stressed at the expense of plurality, and it is precisely
at this point that Absolute Idealism becomes dogmatic as well
as speculative. Furthermore, the difficulty with the dogmatic
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emphasis on the world as One fails to tell us in what sense it
is One. And it must be admitted that Absolute Idealists have
never been agreed as to the character of the ultimate oneness
of the universe. Thinkers of absolutistic tendencies from
Plato on through Spinoza to Hegel have possibly agreed on the
ideas of absoluteness, but not on the nature of the Absolute.
It is this vague and dogmatic character that Pragmatism criti-
cises. How is the world One? An answer to that question, James
regards as imperative. It is true that we may regard the world
as one subject of discourse, as esthetically and possibly tel-
eologically one. But is it One in the sense in which Absolute
Idealists suppose? James concludes that "whoever says that
the whole world tells one story utters another of those mon-
istic dogmas that a man believes at his risk." However emo-
tionally gratifying such a dogma may be, it is entirely specu-
lative. And furthermore it is inconceivable to the human mind
steeped in the facts of empiricism and pluralism. Only as we
regard it as satisfying from the emotional and mystical points
of view do we accept it. Intellectually it cannot be compre-
hended.
b. In the second place. Absolute Idealism is charged
with remoteness from human experience.
It is true that Absolute Idealism is majestic and noble,
but only in a bad sense. It has all the elements of medievalism
about it. But its very remoteness makes it foreign to human
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experience. Its majestic character is its chief disqualifi-
cation, when viewed from the perspective of our immediate con-
tacts with the particulars of life. The Absolute because of
its respectful distance from our empirical level can know
nothing of our human limitations and struggles; and at any
rate it can have no concern about our very human fortunes.
James indicates repeatedly that the very wholeness, complete-
ness and remoteness of the Absolute stands in direct contra-
diction to ourselves; for, says he:
"7/e are invincibly parts, let us talk as we
will, and must always apprehend the Abso-
lute as if it were a foreign being." 1
Thus it is the wholeness of the Absolute's experience as seen
from our human point of view that places Absolute Idealism
at a serious disadvantage in being of use to us in the strug-
gle of existence. Our points of view are inevitably dis-
similar and must remain so. As James puts it again:
"With this radical discrepancy between the
Absolute and relative points of view, it
seems to me that almost as great a bar to
intimacy between the divine and human breaks
out in pantheism as that which we found in
monarchical theism, and hoped that pantheism
might not show. "2
That is to say, the human point of view is temporal;
but it is of the very nature of the Absolute that it is time-
less. Hence there arises the discrepancy and incompatibility
l.-S. See James, A Pluralistic Universe
, pp 41-82 for a criti-
cism of Absolute Idealism.
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of interests between man and the Absolute. It is this factor
that causes James to lament the barrenness of the Absolute
in relation to human experience.
None of the advocates of Absolute Idealism can escape
this charge of foreignness in the portrayal of the Absolute.
James calls attention to the elaborately foreign aspect of the
Absolute as depicted by Bradley. But worse than this is yet
to follow:
"It is neither intelligence nor will,
neither a self nor a collection of
selves, neither truthful, good, nor
beautiful as we understand these
terms."!
This pale and bloodless perfection is obtained at the
expense of all the moral qualities that men count dear. The
Absolute, James regards as a metaphysical monster in the hands
of Bradley. Even the Absolutism of Spinoza is open to this
same charge. And with an ultimate of this kind there can be
neither friendliness nor intimacy.
What, we may ask, is the cause of the foreignness of
the Absolute? Among others we are especially asked to notice
its timeless character. The Absolute is without history. Now
the all essential element in our experience is the fact of his-
tory, temporal succession of states of consciousness, of vol-
itional and intellectual reaction and change. What under-
standing, then, can there be, of our finite experience by such
1. James, A Pluralistic Universe, p 46
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an Absolute as this: Let us quote James again:
"As such, the Absolute neither acts nor
suffers, nor loves nor hates; it has no
needs, desires or aspirations, no failures
or successes, friends or enemies, victor-
ies or defeats. n l
But our relation to reality is that of participation. We
are not merely spectators of all time and of all existence
as Plato says philosophers are. We are not reading a novel
and following the fortunes of the hero or the villain; we are
the heroes and the villains of the worlds tragedy. It is
our fortune that is trembling constantly in the balance, it
is our destiny that is constantly at stake. Time is abstracted
from the experience of the Absolute; but for us time is of the
very stuff of reality, temporal process is vital to our exper-
ience.
Contrast all this, says James, with the emphasis of
Pragmatism. Instead of making philosophy intellectual in the
solving of problems, it regards it as instrumental in forward-
ing the interests of life. Pragmatists are generally at one
in this. They make philosophy serve the practical rather than
the theoretical interests of life. Thus the chief character-
istics of Pragmatism are (a) its emphasis on nominalism. Par-
ticulars are of far more value than wholes. Individual human
experiences are the starting point in contrast to the experience
1. James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp 47-43
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of the Absolute, (b) It is utilitarian in that it stresses
the practical aspects of thought. It is not primarily the
business of philosophy to solve intellectual riddles, but to
furnish us with instruments for the battle of life. And
finally, (c) it is positivistic, in that it is impatient with
verbal solutions of metaphysical problems. Concreteness rather
than abstraction is what is needed. At all these points we are
shown by James that Absolute Idealism has failed. Let us turn
now to the exposition of Pragnatism as we find it in James,
in order to set it more fully in contrast with the great his-
torical rationalistic and absolutistic systems criticized by
its advocates.
3. An exposition of Pragmatism from the point of view of James.
We have already seen that Pragmatism is thoroughly em-
pirical in it 8 attitude toward the problems of philosophy, and
as such is incurably opposed to formalistic or rationalistic
modes of thought. We may now consider the type of Pragmatism
advocated by James as (a) a criterion of truth; (b) as an
approach to metaphysics; and finally (c) in relationship to
humanism and religion.
a. Pragmatism as a criterion of truth.
James approaches the problem of the criterion of truth
from the traditional point of view, namely: the copy theory.
He dissents from this theory, not because the copy theory is
rr
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in all essentials false, but because it is inadeqate • It does
not cover all possible cases of knowing. James assures us that
the Pragmatist has no difficulty in using the copy theory of
truth in those cases where ideas actually copy reality. But
there are so many cases in which ideas do not and cannot copy
reality that the need for a new criterion of truth is at once
apparent. Pragmatism offers a solution of this problem by
putting forward a new criterion. What is meant, James asks,
by the agreement of ideas with reality? His answer follows:
"To agree in the widest sense with a
reality can only mean to be guided either
straight up to it or into its surround-
ings, or to be put into such working
touch with it as to handle either it or
something connected better than if we
disagreed. "1
By stating what he understands to be the nature of agreement
of ideas with reality, James claims that this does not neces-
sarily imply the copy theory of truth. Nor is absolute agree-
ment of ideas with reality necessary. Thus he breaks with
the copy theory as a criterion of truth. If an idea is suf-
ficiently like reality to point to it or to put us in touch
with it, this is all that can be asked. In this way James
prepares the ground for the Pragmatic doctrine of truth,
which he proceeds to define as follows:
"True ideas are those that we can assimi-
late, validate, corroborate and verify.
False ideas are those that we cannot." 2
1. James, Meaning of Truth
, p 6-7
2. James, Meaning of Truffi
.
Preface, p 8
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We are at once struck by the practical and scientific flavor
of this pronouncement. And this scientific emphasis is re-
iterated in a further statement that "the truth of an idea
is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to
an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. "1
And again, more to the same effect as follows:
"Its (truth's) verity is in fact, an event,
a process, the process, namely, of its
verifying itself, its verification, its
validity, is the process of its validation. n<J
It is the utilitarian aspect of ideas which constitutes their
truth or falsehood for us. Thus, we are told that
"Ideas which themselves are but parts of
our experience become true just in so
far as they help us to get into satis-
factory relations with other parts of
our experience. "3
That is to say, ideas are true instrumentally, and not abso-
lutely. They are true in so far as they have power to get
things done, to work. This is the application to philosophy
of the scientific method of testing ideas and so arriving at
truth. Science uses formulas as so many hypotheses with which
to do business. Pragmatism regards truth in the same light,
that is, as purely hypothetical. In so far it must be admitted
1. James, Meaning of Truth
, p 6.
2. James, Pragmatism
, p STTl.
3. James, Pragmatism, p 58.
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that Pragmatism is in harmony with scientific method. It is
this emphasis on the workability of ideas that constitutes
its scientific character. James is exceedingly anxious that
we recognize the utilitarian and expedient character of ideas,
for he goes on to say that
"The true, to put it briefly, is only the
expedient in the way of our thinking, just
as the right is only the expedient in the
way of our behaving. 1,1
We have ideas that are useful and therefore they are true.
These and many other similar statements made by James will
serve to indicate that the Pragmatic idea of what truth is
stresses its workability, its usefulness, its ability to bring
about satisfactory consequences rather than the possession by
it of any intrinsic values. It will also be noted that this
exposition of the meaning of truth is in essential harmony
with the teaching of Peirce. It is to this thinker that James
is indebted for his statement. Indeed, there is little, if
any variation or development of the criterion as laid down
by the founder of Pragmatism.
There are some interesting reasons for the plausibility
of the Pragmatic criterion of truth, and these may properly be
presented here and noted:
1. The idea of the instrumentality of truth is urged repeatedly
by James. The notion that ideas are useful, if they enable us
1. James, Pragmatism, p 222 (Ed. 1909)
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to get into satisfactory relations with our other experiences;
the further idea that philosophy exists not primarily for the
solving of riddles, but for the solving of problems, for for-
warding the interests of life, and as Dewey later puts it, for
the purposes of making adequate environmental adjustments, these
and other similar considerations urge the Pragmatic doctrine
upon us with great practical forced
2. The scientific character of the criterion. James calls
attention to the fact that the formulations of natural law do
not give us complete transcripts of reality, but are simply
statements that enable us to understand how nature works with-
out telling us altogether what nature is. That is, scientific
statements give us, as it were, a kind of shorthand account
of the way in which nature works. The scientist finds such
formulas valuable because they are useful. It is at once seen
that here again Pragmatism scores heavily because of its af-
filiation with the scientific and empirical temper.
3. Furthermore, it is held by Pragmatism that the function of
new ideas ought to be recognized, and the Pragmatic criterion
enables us to recognize this function. For, it is held, the
function of new ideas is to supplement the stock of our past
ideas, and where these are unsatisfactory to act as substi-
tutes for them, especially, if they give us better explanations
1. James, Pragmatism
.
Ch. 2
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than do the old ideas. Thus the he lio-centric theory, the
law of gravitation, and other modern scientific formulae
explain the structure and function of the universe better
than previous theories and so are instrumentally true.^
And thus, we are told, truth is what is better for
us to believe unless it can be shown that it is in definite
2
conflict with greater vital benefits.
b. Pragmatism in Relationship to Metaphysics.
On any reading of James it is olear that his interpre-
tation of Pragmatism, while avowedly not a system of metaphysics,
is through its criticism of previous metaphysical systems, an
attempt to formulate a new metaphysics on the basis of empiri-
cism and pragmatism. In order, therefore, to understand the
metaphysical implications of Pragmatism in the hands of James,
let us consider the criticism of some metaphysical problems,
as, for example, James's criticism of the traditional doctrines
of substance and design.
He attacks the problem of substance as given in its
historical Aristotelian form. The Scholastic philosophers drew
a sharp distinction between substance and attributes. Substance
was held to be the underlying and unknown somewhat that was
1. James, Pragmatism , Ch 2
2. Ibid, Ch 2
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the bearer of visible attributes. Thus, for example, the
soul, a spiritual substance, carries as its attributes, the
mind, the will, the emotions. Chalk, a material substance,
is the bearer of all those attributes that are perceptible
by the senses, hardness, whiteness, friability, cylindrical
shape, etc. Historically, the distinction between the attri-
butes and their underlying substance had been sharply de-
fined. They were regarded as being separate and distinct.
Both, furthermore, were supposed to be actually, though sep-
arately existent. In time, so great was the emphasis here
that there arose the fallacy of hypostatization of what after
all were only abstractions. Thus it came to pass that such
class names as climate, wood, chalk, soul, etc., to mention
no others, were regarded as so many existents, when in reality,
they were really only names given to so many unions of per-
oeptible qualities. Abstraction gave "a local habitation and
a name" to a number of attributes bound together in the unity
of perception and conception. Now James approaches the prob-
lem of substance from the nominalistic point of view and from
the standpoint of Berkeleyan idealism. And thus he assails
the Scholastic doctrine of substance. For, says, he, what is
meant after all by soul or chalk or any other so called sub-
stance? All we can ever know of these things is what they
are known as in experience. To use his own language:
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WA group of attributes is what each sub-
stance is known as, as they form its sole
oash value for experience • The substance
is in every case revealed through them; if
it were cut off from them , we should never
suspect its existence; and if God should
keep sending them to us in an unchanged
order, miraculously annihilating at a cer-
tain moment the substance that supported
them, we never could detect the moment, for
our experiences themselves would be un-
altered. "1
In stating his criticism James is clearly nominalistic and
idealistic in the Berkeleyan sense. The only way, then, in
which we can get anything out of the substance idea is to
treat it pragmatically. In this he follows Berkeley's dictum,
Esse est percipi . James is revealed here in the philosophic
lineage of Locke and Hume, the other famous British empir-
icists; for each of these thinkers, the former partially, and
the latter exhaustively had analyzed substance from the stand-
point of nominalism. For Locke personal identity consisted,
as James indicates, in pragmatically definable particulars.
It is true that Locke never came out wholeheartedly for this
position, but Hume gave the doctrine full and final exposition.
James now proceeds to a general criticism of our in-
tellectual attitude toward such philosophical doctrines as
materialism and theism. Contending that we are here again
facing the fallacy of hypostatization of abstractions, he raises
the question as to the reality of the so called refinement of
1. James, Pragmatism
, p 86.
f(
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spirit or the grossness of matter. Test these concepts prag-
matically, and their abstractions, good or bad, at once vanish.
Treat them intellectually and their remoteness and mystery are
never overcome.
"The theist shows how a God made it (the world);
the materialist shows, and we will suppose with
equal success, how it resulted from blind phy-
sical forces. Then let the pragmatist be asked
to choose between their theories
Concepts are for him things to come back into
experience with, things to make us look for
differences."1
Viewed thus, how can there be any difference as to philosophical
theories, if in any event the world is what it is perceived as ?
To the pragmatist there is no difference in theories as to the
origin of the world, if in spite of their differences, they
mean the same thing. If the world is bad, the hypothesis that
a God created it, makes it no better; if good, the hypothesis
of materialism makes it no worse.
"When a play is once over, the curtain rung
down, you really make it no better by
claiming an illustrious genius for its
author, just as you make it no worse by
calling him a common hack." 2
It is only when we consider the universe as growing and incom-
plete that the practical side of metaphysics emerges at all.
And if matter promises sucoess, then why should any odium be
attached to materialism,
"Doing practically all that a God can do, it is
1. James, Pragmatism
, p 96
2. Ibid, p 99
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equivalent to God, its function is a God's
function, and in a world in which a God
would be superfluous, from such a world a
God could never lawfully be missed, "1
But, nevertheless, James is conscious that matter can have no
real promise for the future, for his own criticism of matter
at this very point is characteristically pragmatic:
"The true objection to materialism is not posi
tive, but negative. It would be farcical at
this day to make complaint of it for what it
is
.
for grossness. Grossness is what gross-
ness does we now know that. We make com-
plaint of it, on the contrary, for what it
is not, -not a permanent warrant for our more
ideal interests, not a fulfiller of our re-
motest hopes. n 2
It is because it is pragmatically valuable to do so that James
turns away from materialism to the notion of God. To quote
him iirectly here:
"A world with a God in it .may indeed
burn up or freeze np, but we then think of
him as still mindful of the old ideals and
sure to bring them elsewhere to fruition,
-
so that where he is, tragedy is only pro-
visional and partial, and shipwreck and
dissolution not the absolutely final things.
The need of an eternal moral order is one of
the deepest needs of our breast." 3
Thus while James seems antagonistic to, he nevertheless ends
up with, metaphysics. He approaches it from the characteristic
standpoint of pragmatism, but he is none the less idealistic
1. James, Pragmatism
, pp 102-1C3
2. Ibid, p 166
3. Ibid, p J.G6
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and theistic in his pronouncement.
Similarly with the question of design. The word is
antiquated and obsolete; the doctrine is threadbare and barren
when viewed from intellectuali stic points of view. Design may
be good and bad; the designer may be benevolent or diabolical
depending on the point of view, if we regard the universe as
a completed project. As a mere rationalistic principle it is
worthless. But if we can regard it as a thing of promise, a
kind of guarantee that the future of the world is in good hands,
then a cosmic confidence may be generated, and from this point
of view the design argument has considerable pragmatic value.
It is obvious that James has simply used a new argu-
ment to establish an apparently discredited philosophical posi-
tion in each of the cases under discussion. For can there
actually be any promise for the future of the world unless in-
telligence is rooted in its past? It is a new way of looking
at problems rather than the contribution of new results that
constitutes the merit of pragmatism. For while he is busy de-
nouncing metaphysics, James turns out to be a metaphysician
operating from the base called pragmatism. Once again, it is
cash values in things that are all important.
In this connection It is fitting to develop James's
teachings regarding God who emerges in his pragmatic discussion
as the climax to his metaphysics. A finite Gpd is presented
a<
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for our consideration as a reaction to the horror inspired
by the rationalistic Absolute.
The basis of this concept of the finite Sod is laid
in the exposition of the world as pluralistic, and not as the
Absolute Idealists claim, a monistic or block universe, but
rather a universe that is loosely strung together, with separa-
tion of its parts and independence among them. 1 If the world
is unified, it is only imperfectly so. Possibly it will always
remain so. It is a world partly joined and partly disjoined.
Prom any point of view unity can only be partially predicated.
It is the incompleteness of the world, teleologically, esthet-
ioally, morally that is its salient characteristic. The Abso-
lute is simply a fiction of the rationalistic temper. Con-
sider the world with its cross purposes, its manifold evils,
its ugliness, and then ask whether such a world can be One?
The answer can only be that the dogma of God as the One or as
2
the One Knower is essentially untruthful. What kind of
Being, then, can God be in such a contradictory and pluralis-
tic universe?
The fallacy in the rationalistic concept arises from
its neglect of our volitional and affectional nature. It can-
not interpret our individual experiences, because it takes no
account of them.
1. James, Pragmatism, p 169
2. Ibid, pp U4-147
3. James, A Pluralistic Universe
, p 306
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Emotionally, psychologically, we are compelled to feel that
we are continuous with a wider self from which saving exper-
iences flow in. But of this psychological fact Rationalism
makes no account. Note what he says here:
nIn spite of nationalism's disdain for the
particular, the personal, the unwholesome,
the drift of all the evidence we have seems
to me to sweep us very strongly towards the
belief in some form of superhuman life with
which we may, unknown to ourselves, be co-
conscious. "1
Following Fechner's idea of a wider consciousness than our own
in the universe, James says again:
"The line of least resistance, then, it seems to
me, both in theology and philosophy, is to
accept, along with the superhuman conscious-
ness, the notion that it is not all embracing,
the notion, in other words, that there is a
God, but that he is finite, either in power or
knowledge, or in both at once. "2
There is not space to develop in detail the advantages which
James associates with this view of a finite God. But he says
that it will abolish the foreigness of the Absolute and will
clothe God with intimacy; that it will harmonize rationalism
and empiricism in a new union because it will recognize the
claims of our emotional as well as our intellectual nature;
it will make God, and this is all important, one of the
eaches in the universe rather than the All. God will be
given a real environment, the universe itself. He will be
1. James, A Pluralistio Universe
, p 309
2. Ibid, p 311
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eeen then as a great adventurer in a world like our own, with
his struggles and triumphs greater than, but nevertheless, of
the same quality as our own. Thus emerges the metaphysical
concept of the finite God, a great, but not an infinite self.
And this doctrine James claims precedent for in the teachings
of the old Jewish patriarchs and prophets, and even in the
teachings of Jesus himself. This is his substitute for the
Absolute; in effect a more intimate restatement in terms of
human experience of the God of traditional theism.
4* The Pragmatism of John Dewey.
Dewey, the leading spirit of the Chicago School of Prag-
matism, often called a newer name, Instrument alism, was born at
Burlington, Vt. Educated in the east, he has successively been
professor of philosophy at Minnesota, Michigan, Chicago and at
present is teaching philosophy at Columbia. He holds the unique
distinction of being the foremost living representative of the
Pragmatic School of Thought.
Dewey's most important books are Studies in Logical
Theory (1903); The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy (1910);
Essays in Experimental Logic (1916)$ Creative Intelligence
(in collaboration with others) (1917); Reconstruction in Phil-
osophy (1920); Human Nature and Conduct (1920); and Experience
and Nature (1924).
John Dewey, the most famous living exponent of Prag-
matism, or the New Instrumentalism announces in common with his
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fellow pragmatists his implacable hostility to historic re-
flective systems of thought. Furthermore, he gives his own
version as to the reasons for their successive failure. In
fact, he points out rather conclusively why several of these
systems have announced their own inability to solve the prob-
lem of reality by an appeal to metaphysics. Among these he
includes those systems which make a final appeal for their
validity to a higher kind of knowledge, such as intuition,
immediate insight or mystical certainty. 1., thus confirming
the fact that reflective, logical thinking is a failure.
Kant's appeal to moral experience to prove what the intellect
has failed to prove, is a case in point. The instance is a
fortunate one, for certainly moral and religious experience
must finally be certified by evidence of an extrinsic nature.
It cannot appeal to itself as final authority, anymore, for
example, than can mysticism. For to admit this kind of appeal
is to base the final truths of religion and the religious ex-
periences of man on grounds that are wholly non-rational. Re-
ligion must be validated by some form of intellectual proof.
All apologists who command our respect recognize this as the
state of affairs, and accordingly seek some such mode of vali-
dation. 2. But there are very definite causes, as Dewey in-
dicates, for the failure of rationalistic metaphysics. Let
us take Greek philosophy as an example. Certainly Greek though^.
1. Dewey, Experience and Nature
, p 16
2. Dewey, Experience and Nature
, p 16
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sought in the main for unity in the universe • But Greek thinkers
when they discovered this unity, found a unity in which there
was no real connection between the intellectual and the practical
The Ionians failed, for example, because they discovered only
a speculative unity in things. What they reduced reality to was
a material invariant, which upon further reflection turned out
to be simply one of the various phenomena of nature with which
they identified reality as a whole. 1* Their misfortune
partially lay in their not possessing adequate scientific in-
struments, but even greater was their failure with respect to
discovering a practical unity in the world of phenomena. Let
us consider the case of Plato f Certainly here was a mind thor-
oughly and admirably equipped to solve the metaphysical problem
of reality from the standpoint of rationalism. But he like-
wise failed. The Platonic world unity was that of an immutable
world seen only by the intellect. This he opposed to the re-
lativistic world of sense perception as seen by the Sophists.
But his concept of cosmic unity was incomplete because it did
2
not include the world of change.
Why, we may ask, did Plato miss so obvious an element
in his intellectual construction of the world? Largely, Dewey
holds, because Greek philosophy arose out of art. Now art for
the Greeks was imitation, a joy in what was finished. The idea
1. Moore, Pragmatism and Its Critics, p 26
2. Ibid, p 34
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of art was transferred to metaphysics; the idea that the cos-
mically real is one with the finished or perfect achievement
of art. Thus, according to this conception, the goal of phil-
osophy is not investigation, but contemplation. However, con-
templation is not the supreme philosophical attitude The
same criticism is no less true of Aristotle, whose fourfold
principle of causation is likewise borrowed from art. And even
granted that philosophy may legitimately borrow its methods
and materials from art, the process in both Plato and Aristotle
is one sided, because the stress is laid on the finished pro-
duct rather than on the processes used to achieve the ends of
2
art. Plato and Aristotle emphasized the importance of ends;
Dewey emphasizes means. The weakness of historic philosophy
lies in the tendency of thinkers to find a stable principle in
the instable world, and having found it, to sit back in con-
templation of this principle, rather than the bending of their
energies to use this principle for the purpose of controlling
reality.
3
Not less severe is Dewey's criticism of empirical
philosophy. Heraclitus and Bergson alike fail to see that
reality is a challenge to investigation, a challenge to change
and to modify rather than to contemplate. Heraclitus admits
that everything is in a state of flux and then does nothing
1. Moore, Pragmatism and its Critics, p 34
2. Dewey, Experience and Nature
, p 21
3. Ibid, p~"53
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about it. He is content to regard as stable the principle
that he has discovered in the instability of events. Bergson
has made much of change, but it does not constitute for him a
1
call to effort. Indeed much that passes for empiricism is
but a dialectical elaboration of data taken from physiology.
Thus we get a stencilled and stenographic picture of reality,
a philosophical principle dissociated from investigation and
effort. 2
The foregoing criticisms serve to lay the groundwork
for Dewey's pronouncements as to the true nature of philosophy.
This principle is not contemplation: that is the process of
art. It is not simplification, for philosophy must begin with
things in their entaglements rather than with simplified things.
It is only by observation and experiment, and the initiation
of procedure to improve wherever possible, the unfinished pro-
cesses of existence that we can have any philosophy worth of
4
the name.
In the word the true business of philosophy is (a)
the analytic dismemberment of experiences, and (b) the synthe-
5
tic reconstruction of it again.
1. Dewey, Experience and Nature
, p 51
2. Ibid, p~6
3. Ibid, p 32
4. Ibid, p 40
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a. Dewey's concept of the nature of existence.
It is all important in any exposition of Dewey to
understand his concept of existence, and this we now proceed
to discuss. Appealing to anthropology, Dewey points out that
the salient fact of existence is its precariousness. Primitive
religion shows clearly that our remote ancestors recognized
the precariousness of existence and by an elaborate, though often
a non-rational technique devised schemes for its maintenance.
They were conscious of the necessity of this in the fact of a
hostile world. Notice the carefully complex ceremonies, rites
and cults which were the apparatus of primitive man in the face
of the unknown. Today we may deny the reality of the perilous
nature of the world, in spite of the vast array of primitive
evidence, by reference to our intellectual confidence in uni-
versal and necessary laws, causes and effects. But our denial
does not obviate the fact that we have carefully sought the
establishment of controls by which the modern mind has achieved
the organized and predictive power of science.* Dewey right-
ly states in this connection that:
"The world is a scene of risk; it is un-
stable, uncertain, uncannily unstable."*
And it is precisely the combination of the stable, that is,
our control of the world in so far as this has been established.
1. Dewey, Experience and Nature
, p 41
2. Ibid, p~S?
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and the unstable in existence that raises the great problem
of philosophy. Says Dewey on this point:
"We live in a world which is an impressive and
irresistible mixture of sufficiencies, tight
completenesses, order, recurrences, which make
possible prediction and control."!
It is this desire for control as a witness to the instability
of existence that gives rise to our protective activities, such
as the accumulation of wealth, and often where this is im-
possible, the seeking of amusement as a way of escape, and on
a large scale, our constant preparation for war. In such a
world, what may we expect the structure of the human mind to
be? This question we must next consider:
b. Dewey's concept of the nature of consciousness.
With the foregoing treatment of the nature of existence
in mind we naturally expect that Dewey's concept of the nature
of consciousness will be thoroughly naturalistic and biologi-
cal. And this is precisely the conception that he gives us.
Starting from the view point of Herbert Spencer that man is an
organism with a mind that seeks to maintain correspondence be-
tween the inner and outer relations of life, Dewey reminds us
that this doctrine of correspondence must bear in mind the
special interests of the organism. Mind is not a passive re-
flection of reality, but a striving and initiating factor.
1. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p 47
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It is a feeler, so to speak, put out by the organism. Its
important characteristics are interest, activity, trial, success
and failure.
Let us analyze Dewey's teaching here a little further.
Turn to consciousness and what do we find there 7 We find only
some particular character as blue, or round. There is no class
of elements which belong exclusively as such to consciousness.
The elements which enter into it are neither physical nor psy-
chical, but are common or neutral elements of experience, and
these serve to connect consciousness with various objective
orders of being and different units of consciousness with each
other. Hence the action of mind is selective rather than cre-
ative, for it derives its content from its environment and
adds nothing to it save the circumstance of selection. Accord-
ingly, Dewey does not regard consciousness as a distinct sub-
stance nor even as a distinct quality, but as a grouping of
characters borrowed from the environment. To quote him:
"Mind seems to be nothing more than a
complex kind of interaction of con-
sciousness with events or the environ-
ment."!
Consciousness, then, does not exist as an entity, for we are
never conscious of consciousness as an entity. The self is an
individualized affair, a grouping of the elements of experience
in which activity and the affectional state are most marked.
1. Dewey, Experience and Nature
, p 261.
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The mind is concrete. Thus he goes on to say:
"Mind denotes the whole system of meanings
as they are embodied in the workings of
organic life: consciousness in a being
with language denotes awareness or per-
ception of meanings; it is the perception
of actual events, whether past, contem-
porary or future, in their meanings the
having of actual ideas. "1
And again:
"Consciousness is not a separate realm
of being, but is the manifest quality
of existence when nature is most free
and active."
Thus in harmony with his doctrine of the precariousness of
existence Dewey gives us a realistic and behavioristio doct-
rine of consciousness. If consciousness be then but a group-
ing of meanings, what is the place of thought in experience ?
This question we must now answer.
c. Dewey's teaching as to the place of thought in ex
perience.
Existence being what it is, Instrumentalism lays a
new emphasis on the nature off thought and its place in exper-
ience. Experience itself is defined as conduct and thinking is
a mode or stage in conduct. Conduct in turn is defined as "an
action which is seeking to maintain and develop that which is
satisfactory and valuable or to get rid of that which is un-
2
satisfactory or worthless."
1. Dewey, Experience and Nature
, p 303-305
2. Moore, Pragmatism and its Critics, p 4
t
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Thia general position leads us to an analysis from the point of
view laid down by Dewey and other Pragmatists as to the general
relation of thought to experience.
(1) First, as to the antecedents of thought. Thought is
awakened in the mind by the operation of external stim-
uli; these stimuli are responsible for the rise of two
kinds of ideas: ideas that are coincident, i.e., ideas
which just happen to come into consciousness together.
These are a prolific source of error; and ideas that
are coherent, i.e., ideas which belong together. These
supply positive material for knowledge. Both kinds of
ideas come into consciousness through the mechanism of
association. It is this mixture of the coincident and
the coherent which sets the problem for reflective
thought The source of thought is the field of
sense experience, a field objective to consciousness.
The field of sense perception is one in which the
factors are incompatible with each other. Thought
selects from among them what is useful, relegating
others to the subjective realms. Thus, Dewey continues:
"There is always as antecedent to thought
an experience of some subject matter of
the physical or social world or organized
intellectual world, whose parts are act-
ively at war with each other, so much so
that they threaten to disrupt the entire
experience, which accordingly for its own
maintenance requires deliberate re-defini-
tion and re-relation of intensional parts.
This is the reconstructive process termed
thinking." 2
1. Dewey, Studies in Logical Theory
,
Vol. 2, p 28
2. Ibid, vol. 2, p 40
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The significance of Dewey's position lies in the fact that
he attempts to show that (a) unreflective experience, de-
fined in terms of sensations and their combinations, pro-
vide the material for reflective thinkings And therefore
the matter of experience is not assumed as given by rational
thought, as in the case of the transcendental logic* And (b)
that thought is something more, on the other hand, than the
mere association and occurrence of ideas. In short, that
thought does have a work, dignity and value of its own in dis-
tinguishing between the coincidental and the coherent.
(2) The Instrumentalist criticism of the Platonic or
classical interpretation of the nature of thought. Thought
2
was defined as contemplation. This was an error due to
the platonic division of the world into superior and inferior,
thought and sense perception, with the assumption that man's
highest duty is the contemplation of the perfect, immutable
world of the Ideas. Now while this concept has been of great
value to esthetics, it is not the correct view. For it is the
business or thought to do something more than to form symbols
or images of reality without affecting it one jot or tittle.
The true view of thought is the Pragmatic one, the view that
thought is instrumental, operative, active. This gives to
thought a real function in experience, making its nature.
1. Dewey, Studies in Logical Theory . Vol 2, p 29
2. Dewey, Reconstruction of Philosophy
, p 106
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scientific, progressive and practical • Thus we can make
a scientific appraisal of thought as including the processes
of observation and the forming of hypotheses for the solution
2
of problems presented by the observed facts . This, then,
is the operative as constrasted with the contemplative point
of view advocated by Plato.
Clearly, then, the function of thou$it is concrete
and purposive. If we divorce though from conduct, if we
think of concepts without relating them to concrete situations,
they mean nothing whatever. Try to think of justice, essence,
matter, or liberty, we are told, and note how without reference
to behavior these concepts are emptied of all meaning. We can-
not strip thought of volition or purpose, for if we do, we can-
not perceive its relation to conduct. The function of though^,
8
then, is the intentional reconstruction of experience.
Dewey says here that:
"Thinking arises when problems are to be
solved or decisions to be made."4
Logic is clearly something more than the study of formal
reasoning. Even idealists will agree with this. But the prag-
matist goes on to claim that all thinking is so mixed with de-
1. Dewey, Reconstruction of Philosophy
, pp 112,116,119
2. Ibid, p~T?5
3. Ibid, p 134
4. Ibid, p 184
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siring, willing, acting; in short, that it is so much a part
of conduct that thinking merely for the sake of knowledge is
impossible."'" Thought is instrumental, the actual manipula-
tion of our spontaneous experiences, e.g., of motion, light,
sound, our pains, joys, loves and hates, which are brought
to bear on one another in such wise as to lead to the con-
trol of these spontaneous variations and the introduction of
new variations. Here is the Pragmatic concept of the
character of thought. The function of thought is to connect
one experienced thing with another. The chief difference in
ideas is their efficiency in connecting ideas with objects.
Those ideas which do connect consciousness with objects are
true; those which do not, are false. The test of truth for
Dewey as for James is verification. Only as ideas validate
themselves by leading us to their objects, James told us,
are they true. Although starting from a slightly different
base, Dewey arrives at the same result. The place of thought
in experience, is to enable us to control experience, modify
it, and this is the whole duty of thought*
Dewey's teaching about the social order.
In harmony with his general antagonism to the intell-
ectual or conceptual analysis of reality, and the instrumental
1. Moore, Pragmatism and Its Critics
, p 13
2. Ibid, pT8
3. Ibid, p 85
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oharaoter of thought Dewey proceeds to offer an Instrumentalist
criticism of the traditional concept of society. His criticism
centers around the historic discussion of universals as seen in
Plato, for this he thinks has determined for subsequent genera-
tions of thinkers the historic conceptions of the relations be-
tween individuals and society. The basis of this criticism is
founded in opposition to the reality of universals. Dewey re-
gards these as invalid because they are founded in formal logic.
On this' ground all historic conceptions, for example, of the
State are severally challenged. Dewey's reasons are as follows:
(1) Because all such conceptions are committed to the logic
of general notions under which specific situations are to be
brought. To take the case of the concept of the state: this
is an abstraction, and as such is static. The individual and
society are both dealt with in an abstract way, and thus the
treatment is not true to the actual concrete situation. The
situation is an individual and not a general one. Dewey regards
nominalism rather than Platonic realism as the real or actual
situation before us. Hence his opposition to the idea of the
state as existing before the individual. .
(2) Because this view of the state is static and eternally com-
plete, and as such supplies the apparatus for Justifying the
continuance of the status quo. In particular has this been the
case with respect to the social application of the Hegelian
idealism. But this is a social philosophy built on futile so-
cial concepts. Let us appeal to science and see whether such
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concepts have not long ago been discarded as useless* Not
only so, but in this connection there seems to be no reality to
the actual conflict that recurs between capital and labor.
View these from the Hegelian point of view, and what are these
struggles, but apparent factors of a whole conceptually con-
structed? This is Dewey 1 3 interpretation of the concept worked
out by James from the point of view of Absolute Idealism* Human
effort and experience are unreal. But what is the actual situa-
tion here again? Dewey shows that if the self or state is re-
2garded as given or complete, there can be no real progress.
And furthermore, to regard either as such is to begin at the
wrong end, an end far removed from actual human experience. The
true situation, as Dewey calls it, will regard the state as in-
strumental and not final. This concept of the state admittedly
has value in the subordination of minor groups and interests,
but under no view ought the state to be regarded as an end in
itself. Valuable as the conceptual point of view is in foster-
ing and co-ordinating the activities of voluntary groups, it is
not a final but rather a preliminary concept, and must be so
regarded in relationship to the growth of the Inter-state. On
the other hand, the real view of the social order lies in recog-
nizing the supreme importance of the individual. It is for his
sake that society exists. True, the individual must realize his
ends in conformity to the conditions that society imposes, but
1. Dewey, Bee onst ruction of Philosophy
, pp 198-199
2. Ibid, p"TS5
3. Ibid, p 202
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it is the individual and not society that is all important.
Hence, Dewey concludes, neither the individual nor society can
be considered alone, hut both are correlative, organic to each
1
other and subordinate to each other.
f. Dewey's teaching about Ethics.
His position is that ethics should concern itself with
the detection of ills and the formulation of remedies rather
than with the following of rules and the pursuit of fixed ends.
This theory of fixed ends, we are told, leads to endless dis-
pute. It do es not help in the solution of individual prob-
lems, and is hurtful because of the division of values into
4instrumental and instrinsic. Further, belief in a single,
ultimate good is obsolete and smacks of the feudalism in -which
the conception was developed. This belief needs to be re-
placed by one that emphasizes plurality, change, movement,
individual values; goods that are individualized. This in
turn involves the belief that moral laws are but instruments
for attaining and realising individual goods or ends.
The advantages of this pragmatic concept are enumerated
as follows: The problem of evil is taken out of metaphysics
and is placed in a concrete situation. Evil is no longer a
1. Dewey, Reconstruction of Philosophy
, p 187
2. Ibid, p"T55
3. Ibid, p 166
4. Ibid, p 172
5. Ibid, p 162
6. Ibid, 167, 168
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subject for dialectic, but for alleviation. Again, not
optimism nor pessimism, but meliorism is the best metaphysical
2
view of evil on this supposition. Finally, this view ex-
hibits the need of continuous reconstruction of human experience
through education and ethics* Consequently, there can be no
standards of judgment about men as to whether they are good or
bad. In any case we cannot apply such judgments to all men
4
alike. It is sufficient if men show progress. But curiously
enough one asks, if there can be no standard of judgment, how
can progress be determined? How are we to determine the dif-
ferences in men or objects unless we know or have criteria by
which to judge? And, again, why does one have to be an instru-
mentalist in order to regard the problem of evil as one for
alleviation? It is moral earnestness rather than any specific
intellectual view that is requisite here, and certainly it
will not be denied that much was done toward the alleviation of
evil before Pragmatism gave this statement an articulate voice.
g. Dewey 1 b exposition of the Instrumentalist theory of Values.
Dewey says:
"There are no eternal values as is believed
by idealism. On the contrary, values are
precarious, changing, evanescent ."5
And again:
"Values are values, things immediately having
certain intrinsic qualities."^
1. Dewey, Reconstruction of Philosophy
, p 177
2. Ibid, p~T55
3. Ibid, p 176
4. Ibid, p 176
5. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p 398
6. Ibid, p""~3?S
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This is characteristic of the Dewey point of view, and might
be expected as a logical sequence to his general philosophical
and ethical position. The imperraanence of values and their
subjectivity is held. But this is surely too sweeping a gener-
alization. Let us admit that some values are impermanent, but
why all values? Dewey rightly holds that many ends or values
are exclusively good, and we may earnestly hope that these may
be permanent. Idealists no less than Pragmatists will pray for
such a consummation. Many realities, values and dis-values
alike are impermanent. "They have their day and cease to be."
Failure, exhaustion, ignorance, death, no less than success,
achievement, certain kinds of knowledge are more or less per-
manent. But Dewey's weakness lies in a metaphysical position
that makes no provision for the conservation of values.
Likewise with respect to the subjectivity of values.
Dewey says that values have no existence apart from human de-
sires,^" a position very similar to that held by Perry. He
points out, however, what is rather obvious. Undoubtedly
values arise in response to our desires. But the admission that
Dewey makes, viz:- that there is warm emotional and intellectual
p
or critical appreciation of values, is certainly damaging to
his general theory. He is right when he says that it is the
business of philosophy to criticise values and their relative
worth. 3
1. Dewey, Experience and Nature
, p 399
2. Ibid, p"7E0l
3. Ibid, p 398
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And yet we find him in an earlier passage criticizing Greek
philosophy on the ground that it selected and arranged ends.^"
If we are to be good psychologists, we shall have to recognize
the preferential function of consciousness. But the impor-
tant problem is not the relation of values to human desires*
We may at once grant that there is a relation: but rather what
is the fate of values, what is to become of them after they
are once perceived? Certainly a naturalistic metaphysics has
no rational answer to this question. It is for this reason that
Dewey and Moore both neglect the pursuit of this question and
stress conduct as being more important in any case than values.
But this is certainly to avoid the issue. Once the question
of the fate of values has been raised, it should not be dismissed
in so light and unsatisfactory a fashion. And even then, it may
be doubted whether conduct is of more importance than values.
For, either conduct or values must face the problem of finality.
Conduct is either an end in itself or is instrumental in the
creation of values. To grant the instrumentality of conduct is
still to raise the question of values. Let us fearlessly ask
on what grounds we can be sure of the ultimate objectivity and
permanence of values, and we shall find no answer unless we
postulate the existence of a world ground, an active self, a
Supreme Mind, which as Hoffding says, if it is to mean anything
at all, must function as a principle of fidelity in the universe
1. Dewey, Experience and Nature
, p 115
2. Coe, Psychology of Heligion7 P 40
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and must concern itself with the conservation of values. The
weakness of Instrument alism at this point lies in its exclu-
sively instrumental bias and emphasis. The rational mind re-
fuses to be satisfied with the naturalistic solution that be-
trays our deepest hopes and aspirations.
5. A summary of the general teachings of Pragmatism.
a. Psychologically, thinking is regarded as not being a
separate aspect of our nature. It is the process of inter-
action and development of our instincts and appreciations.
b. Logically, an idea is regarded as a perfect organic part
of real change in a developing world, and not merely a symbol,
a psychic X unaffected by the world. Thought is an integral
part of the world and is not outside it.
c. Conduct is an active participation in the creation of ideals
and not a mere carrying out of ideals existing from all eternity
in the world of thought.
d. Politically, pragmatism stands for social democracy as op-
posed to hierarchies of any sort.
e. Metaphysically, pragnatism holds that change is real and
not apparent merely.
f. Theologically, God is held to be an active, struggling
Being and not an eternally complete One.
1. Hoffding, Philosophy of Religion
, p 130
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g. Finally, Pragmatism is held to be a militant idealism, a
belief in the real power and efficacy of ideas to achieve sal-
over
vation. It is a heroic attempt to carry/into logic and meta-
physics the power of ideas.^"
V. Criticism of Pragmatism*
The foregoing account of Pragmatism as expounded by its
chief American representatives is subject to various criticisms,
and some of these we shall now outline.
1* The criticism of the claim of Pragmatism to be an adequate
philosophy of science.
Pragmatism makes much of its affiliation with the experi*
mental method of the sciences. If the tendency of philosophy
is to follow the dominant science as to its trend is true, then
Pragmatism can certainly make good its pretension to be scienti-
fic. Biology is among the foremost of our natural sciences to-
day. Receiving its original impetus from Darwin, the theory
of evolution has been since 1858 the watchword of intellectual
and scientific advance. The laboratory method of Biology cer-
tainly entitles it to a high place in human respect. But if
Pragmatism claims allegiance because of its biological affilia-
tions, other forms of philosophic theory may make a similar
claim with as much justification. Neo-Realism, following the
development of mathematics, physics and logic is entitled on
the same ground to as high a place as Pragmatism. Idealism
1. Moore, Pragmatism and its Critics
, pp 16-19
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because of its affiliations with psychology and logic may claim
equal consideration. Historically also philosophical theories
are entitled to much respect on this ground, for successive
philosophies have been influenced in succeeding generations
by the dominant science of their time. Thus Hobbes could ap-
peal to physics and mathematics as the basis of his sensational
psychology and materialistic metaphysics. Berkeley could appeal
to psychology and epistemology as an adequate basis of his sub-
jective idealism and Hume made a like appeal to the associa-
tion psychology as the ground of his skepticism. It is pre-
cisely the appeal of Pragmatism to experimental science that
constitutes the excellence and defect of the various types of
Pragmatism. In fact any philosophical theory that is based
exclusively on either the natural or physical sciences is open
to this objection: for the result is partial, and we are struck
with the fact that Pragmatism suffers increasingly from its
biological reading of experience. This is particularly true
in Instrumentalism as taught by Dewey. His theory of the or-
ganism and of consciousness suffers from a thorough-going be-
haviorism that is the outcome of biology. The need of phil-
osophy is comprehensiveness, synopsis, and biological prag-
matism fails signally at this point. Many of the complex
fields of human knowledge, in fact, all of them, furnish
material for philosophy. To interpret experience exclusively
from the point of view of biology does not do justice to our
intellectual demands. Truly does ?lato say that
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"The philosopher is the spectator of all
time and of all exist ence."l
Repeatedly we have been urged to see life steadily and to see
it whole. But it is this wholeness that counts for so little
in the eyes of Pragmatism. And yet a very large part of human
experience is concerned with issues that are definitely non-
biological in character. The truly scientific philosophy will
be that whose materials are the conclusions of all the sciences.
Without synopsis, analysis and experimentation are not adequate
methods in philosophy.
2. Criticism of the Pragmatic Criterion of Truth.
Pragmatism, as we have seen, has much to say abflrat cash
values and practical consequences. James appeals for the accep-
tance of Pragmatism on this basis alone. Truth is that which
validates, verifies, corroborates itself. Pragmatists of all
schools agree on this. Now, there is truth in this Pragmatic
statement. For example, the Pragmatist is correct in saying
that truth or judgment is a response to a situation and not
merely a copying of an externally given object. But it is
certainly not justified in saying that because a judgment
meets our needs that this judgment is therefore true. A jud-
gment needs to be proved true as well as useful. Pragmatism
2
errs in defining the useful as the true. Truth, to be sure,
must be so independently of its satisfaction of my needs.
1. Republic,
2. Royce, Philosophical Review
,
March, 1904, p 141
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Thus evolution is true whether it satisfies my needs or not,
no matter what the nature of my needs (intellectual or moral)
may be, if it is true on other and independent grounds. Here
certainly is one instance of truth that in many instanoes can
satisfy no conceivable needs. In what way would a scissors
grinder or a hod carrier be benefited by the truth or falsity
of evolution? And there are countless other cases in which no
conceivable need is served by the doctrine of evolution* All
that the Pragmatist can claim is that his judgment is a state-
ment of his reaction to any given situation. But it has no
further authority than that and therefore cannot be used as
a criterion,"1'
The true test of any judgment where truth is concerned
is its conformity to other judgments in a harmonious or united
system of truth, Royce has clearly shown that if the Prag-
matist has merely adjusted himself to his conscious environ-
ment, by means of his own inner mental construction, then he
has instructed nobody, and has said nothing that has any genu-
2
ine meaning for anybody but himself. If judgments are true,
they are so, furthermore, because they ought to be true. As
Royce says:
"For the ought is a real ought or it is nothing."
And
"A judgment has its place in a complete system of
truth or else it is not true."
1. Royce, Philosophical Review, March 1904, p 142
2. Ibid, p 134
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And again
"If I view my opinion as true, I demand that
another than my present self shall accept
this opinion." 1
The important thing, therefore, is not whether what is use-
ful is true. Many beliefs, dogmas, creeds, devices, opinions,
are useful enou$i to those who hold them, but they are certain-
ly not true. We may admit truth and falsity as relative to
insight, experience, life and action, but unless there is ob-
jectivity to truth, an objective oughtness, how can we say
2
whether there is truth or not? The fact is that our judg-
ments can only be true as they find their harmonious place in
the judgments of an all inclusive system. The coherence
criterion of truth is certainly much more rational and logi-
cal than that of Pragmatism.
3. Criticism of the Epistemological Basis of Pragnatism.
The historic logical affiliations of Pragmatism with
the doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason in Kant and
the Fichtean idealists must not blind us to the naturalistic
4
and empirical nature of developed Pragmatism. It is this
tendency toward naturalism that is accountable for the diffi-
culties that Pragmatism experiences with epistemology. Gener-
ally speaking, the epistemology of pragmatism is an attempt
5
to apply to knowledge the vitalistic or bio-centric method.
1. Royce, The Eternal and the Practical, Philosophical Review
,
March, 1904, p 134
2. Ibid, p 139
3» Brightman, Introduction to Philosophy
, pp 58-66
4. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies
, p 198
5. Ibid, p 199
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Traditionally epistemology dealt with knowledge rather than the
knowing process, hut Pragmatism emphasizes the psychological and
logical importance of the knowing process itself. Knowing as we
have seen is an intensely practical affair, a phase of life and
of action on an environment. Hence Pragmatism assigns to ideas
a definitely instrumental role, that of leading us to objects
and forming plans of action. It is this emphasis that leads to
1-2
ambiguity in Pragmatic epistemology. James is a good illus-
tration of this. He starts with a definite epistemological
dualism. Thus he says:
"I start with two things, the objective facts
and the claims, and indicate which claims, the
facts being there, will work successfully as
the latters 1 substitutes and which will not.
I call the former claims true. "3
But this statement is contradicted by the tendency toward epis-
temological monism due to Berkeley's influence upon his think-
ing. His theory of radical empiricism is clearly monistic and
idealistic and idealistic as to theory of knowledge. To say that
things are what they are experienced as is to lean definitely
4in the direction of idealism. But here we are confronted with
an illustration of the ambiguity of Pragmatism. Whose experience
is meant? There certainly can be no such thing as experience in
general. Thus James in his departure from a realistic to an
1-2. Cf also Russell, Some Difficulties with the Epistemology
of Pragmatism
.
Phil. Rev. Vol 14, p 322-343. Cr also
Fite. Pragmatism and Truth
.
Phil. Rev. Vol 20, pp 1-29
3. Cf also. James. The Meaning"of Truth
, p 217
4. Cf Rogers, James's Theory of Knowledge
.
Phil. Rev. Vol 15,
pp 577-596
"My account of truth is realistic and follows the epistemological
dualism of common sense." James, Meaning of Truth
, p 217
*I
4
(
t
)
I
115
idealistic epistemology leaves much to be desired in the way
of clearness. Only as we recognize the latent idealism in
James t can we define his theory of knowledge as monistic ideal-
ism, and when we have done this, his exposition of the nature of
experience raises a question as to his logic unless there is
posited the existence of the One Knower that he so vigorously
objects to in his metaphysics*
When we turn to Eewey we do not find this ambiguity.
But on the other hand his epistemology is thoroughly realistic.
In his eagerness to trace genetic development of the knowing
process, and his thoroughgoing application of biological methods
to philosophy, together with his exposition of the nature of
consciousness and experience, he clearly reveals himself as an
epistemological realist. But this is an indefensible episte-
mology, and is open to similar criticisms made against episte-
mological idealism in James. When we say that all is idea or
all is object, in one case we overlook the necessity of an ob-
ject of knowledge and in the other, the necessity of a knowing
subject. There can be no experience or knowledge in either
case. Hence the epistemology of Pragmatism is generally de-
fective and inadequate. Further, the general emphasis on the
genetic character of knowledge omits a very important aspect
of man's relationship to reality. It may fairly be held that
man has moments when he is not seeking to outwit an enemy or
subdue an environment. Plato and idealists generally are
correct in emphasizing the place of contemplation, knowledge
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for its own sake as a legitimate activity of the mind. Prag-
matism commits an error in identifying an important function
of intelligence with its only function.^ And again, if Prag-
matism replies that its conception of the nature of thought is
essentially the true one, the reply is, that it is not the whole
truth and that is what philosophy seeks.
4. Criticism of Pragmatism in relationship to Metaphysics.
Pragmatism lays no claim to metaphysics, and assures us
that it is a method only in philosophy. However, the whole
question of pragmatic logic and epistemology, eventuates in a
metaphysics of some sort, and it is obvious that Pragmatism
cannot evade metaphysical issues when once its criticism of
preceding metaphysical systems is attempted. Accordingly we
are brought face to face with the metaphysics of Pragmatism.
It is interesting to note not only that Pragmatism develops
a metaphysical position, but that it is definitely pluralistic.
This was to be expected in view of the importance of individuals
in pragmatic criticism. The pluralistic metaphysics of Prag-
matism is quite defensible, in fact as defensible as monistic
metaphysics. But the weakness of Pragmatic metaphysics lies
in its inadequate concept of God. This inadequacy is due to
the immense time and energy elaborated on the development of
the finite individual in the system of incomplete reality to
1. Patrick Introduction to Philosophy
, p 360
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which Pragaatism is pledged. If the weakness of Absolute
Idealism lies in its inability to do justice by the finite
self, the problem of error and of evil, it is no less true that
Pragmatism errs in devoting too much time to individual fortunes
and too little on the fortunes of the Supreme Self. The finite
is emphasized at the expense of the infinite*
When Pragnatism is idealistic it is also personal-
istic as in the case of James, His theory of God may be defined
as Enotheism, the theory that God is in the world as a finite
Being, It is this concept of the finite God that raises some
serious questions as to the adequacy of Pragmatic metaphysics,
a. First, there is the inability of Pragmatism
to furnish moral guarantees in a reality dominated by a finite
God, What guarantee is there that such reality may not prove
too great a problem for a God less than infinite, definitely
limited in knowledge and power or in both? As finite he must
be subject to the hazards that any finite being is exposed to.
If omnipotence and omniscience cannot be predicated of such a
being it is difficult to see how God can really be the guaran-
tor of the permanence of such values as we jointly created.
How can such a God function, as Hoffding suggests, as principle
of fidelity? Further, there can be no assurance of the perman-
ence of his supremacy. The picture of a finite God, militant,
heroic, adventuring himself on ever so large a scale in reality
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is surely inspiring, but it does not carry with it the assur-
ance of permanence that we crave. Thus the moral advantages
of such a God, no matter how much this concept may appeal to
our sympathies, and no matter what the voluntaristic values
inherent in it, is definitely offset by a grave doubt as to
the permanence of such a Being in a universe as hostile appar-
ently to him as it is to us.
b. In the second place, Pragmatism is guilty of
oversimplification of the central problem of metaphysics. We
must still, even on the Pragmatic hypothesis, raise the question
as to the origin of such a being as God, as well as his real
place aod purpose in a reality that is greater than He. Further,
under such a view, what is the origin of reality itself? How
can we be metaphysical at all unless we at least attempt an
answer to this question? We still have all the old problems
of metaphysics before us. The nature of Time and Space, the
problem of Evil, the relationship of the Supreme Self to
finite selves, these and many more problems have to be raised
do novo after Pragmatism has said its final wori here. The
fact is that a theistic interpretation of the Supreme Self as
a world ground, as voluntarily limiting himself in relation-
ship to the world, has at least fewer disadvantages than the
Pragmatic concept of a finite God."^"
11 Brightman, Introduction to Philosophy
, pp 338-339
tr
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c. In the case of Pragmatism of the biological
type, we are again faced with the problem of metaphysics, the
origin of reality itself. The issue is between idealism and
naturalism (realism, materialism, etc.). And the old material-
ism is certainly no longer adequate to explain anything. On
the other hand modern physics and mathematics, with their new
version of the nature of physical things, compel us to raise
anew the problem of the origin of the physical universe. Hence
the answer to naturalism of any sort must be found in logic, in
epistemology and psychology and metaphysics. Logically, Prag-
matism is incoherent. Its criterion of truth as analysis of
sense perception is true only in so far as it goes. What is
needed is a more comprehensive understanding of the place of
our perceptions in relationship to our own and the judgments
of others. Psychologically, Pragmatism must either be ideal-
istic or realistic. But if realistic as in the case of Prag-
matism of the Dewey school, it omits the really important facts
that are demanded by a coherent interpretation of consciousness.
We refuse to interpret the self in naturalistic categories.
Apparently then the real answer to the attempts of Pragmatism
at metaphysics is that it has not offered us a real equivalent
for the idealism that it seeks to displace.
5. General Criticisms of Pragmatism. Some general criticisms
are:
a. Its ambiguity. This is particularly applicable to
its criterion of truth. What is meant by satisfaction, conse-
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quences, cash values? These vary with individuals. Further,
these vary in individuals themselves. What is satisfactory
now, may not be so tomorrow. The difficulty here lies in
getting precise definitions as to what it is that Pragmatism
wants. Lovejoy has called attention under this head to the
thirteen pragmatisms. And one imagines there might be many
more.^"
b. Its tendency to relativism. Its inadequate metaphysics
or its disdain of metaphysics takes away from Pragmatism mny
valid principle by which experience can be unified. If Prag-
matism is to be relieved of this relativism with which it is
infected it must recognize the presupposition implicit in
itself of an indispensable background, a logical and ontological
system very different from that to which it explicitly ap-
peals. 2
c. Its tendency to neglect ends in its zeal for means. This
compels it to make no final appraisal of any number of exper-
iences, intellectual, moral, esthetic and religious, all of
which are ends as well as means. Its emphasis on humanistic
aspects; its neglect of finalities as seen in religion; its
stress on thought as a means of biological adjustment to the
neglect of contemplation, an element of real value in thought;
its tendency toward behaviorism as against idealism are all
1. Gf. Watson, J. Plato or Protagoras
.
Phil. Rev. Sept., 1907
2. Philosophical Review
.
May 1905. p 325. Similarity of
Pragmatism to the Sophists .
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manife stat ions of its intense zeal for means as opposed to ends.
As such it may fairly be said that Pragmatism, in spite of its
many advantages constitutes a vicious anti-intellectualism.
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PART THREE
A CRITICAL COMPARISON OF THE SOPHISTS AND
THE PRAGMATISTS
In the foregoing pages we have endeavored to set forth
the teachings of the ohief Sophists and some representative
Pragmatists. Our effort has centered itself around their
doctrines as these affect epistemology, psychology, logic
and metaphysics. We have already a partial criticism of both
the Sophists and the Pragmatists before us. It now remains
to outline a comparison and criticism of both types of thought.
The aim of this part of the thesis will be to indicate the
common standpoint of the Sophists and the Pragmatists; to
indicate the reasons in each case for their point of view.
This will be followed by a comparative criticism of their
philosophical systems.
It is proposed to adopt the following order of develop-
ment. First, we shall determine the standpoint of both schools
of thought as definitely Humanistic and indicate the development
of Pragmatism as Naturalistic. The basis of this Humanistic
and Naturalistic character we shall see to be closely affiliated
in the case of the Sophists with their interest in practical
life, and in the growth of democracy and a new social conscious-
ness. In the case of the Pragmatists the basis is found in
their affiliations with science, democracy, the theory that man
is the maker of his own world, and the growth of the new social
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consciousness consequent on these new movements in modern life.
We shall also attempt a criticism and evaluation of the common
interest of the Sophists and the Pragmatists in philosophy and
its implications for values and religion. Finally, we shall
attempt a criticism of both types of thought by calling atten-
tion to the fact that they have failed to construct an adequate
basis in psychology, epistemology and logic so that as a result
they have given us only a partial account of experience and can-
not construct an adequate program for action or a satisfactory
metaphysics.
I. The Sophists and Pragmatists as representatives of the
Humanistic standpoint and interest in philosophy.
In order fully to appreciate the significance of the
Sophists and the Pragmatists it is essential that we define
their special interest and standpoint in philosophy. This
standpoint and interest is without doubt Humanistic. Schiller
describes Protagoras as the great Humanist and commends him
frankly for his position, as we have seen in his debate re-
garding the merits of Protagoras and Plato."'" The Sophists
themselves do not claim to be otherwise. Their pronouncements
as to the impossibility of metaphysics; their practical in-
terest in human affairs are the hall mark of the Humanism by
which they are characterized. The Pragmatists occupy in-
1. Schiller, Studies in Humanism , See the chapter, From Plato
to Protagoars.
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creasingly the same position. It is true that much water has
flowed under the philosophic bridge between these two schools
of thought, but Pragmatism in James, Schiller and Dewey is
strongly HumaivQiltic in its emphasis. Pragmatism has definite-
ly renounced metaphysics and other worldly interests and its
whole interest lies in the elaboration of such social programmes
as can be devised independently of this interest. We may
briefly notice the specific causes in each case for the Human-
istic atmosphere of these thinkers.
1. The causes contributing to the Humanism of the Sophists.
The fifth century in Greece as we have seen was a time
of great national consolidation. The most significant episode
im the life of the time was the growth of a new national con-
sciousness after the successful termination of the war with
Persia. The orderly and disciplined western soldiery had
proved themselves to be easily the superiors of the Oriental
hordes who had sought to subdue them. Accordingly this age
was one of great leadership. And it is significant that the
greatest geniuses of Greece find their development in this
period. Great soldiers, sailors, statesmen, artists, men of
letters, philosophers and poets indicate the high level to
which human intelligence attained, a level even now the envy
of succeeding periods of development. Accordingly, we find
an unbounded belief in the ability of human intelligence to
work out its own salvation. Characteristically a Greek pose.
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it found more pronounced accentuation than ever when the nation
was flushed with victory. The genius of Pericles is symbolic
of the unbounded belief in the creative and constructive power
of intelligence to work out problems that come within the circle
of human interests. With this feet in mind, let us set forth
the currents in Greek life that carried the Sophists with them,
a* First, we may notice again the affiliation of
these thinkers with the democratic development of the
state. Important reforms of the constitution, of
judicial procedure, of the organization of the courts,
was under way in the time of the Sophists. The new
opportunities for livelihood presented abundant chal-
lenge to aspiring young men, and the Sophists were
keenly alive to the opportunities thus presented to
minister to the growing demand for education and train-
ing. Thus their whole energy was consumed, and we
rightly judge that what interest they had in specula-
tion was slight at the best. There was little time,
in the judgments of these men, for interests that were
not practical. The demand was for training in. con-
nection with a specific task. This demand the So-
phists satisfied.
b. In the second place, we may note the influence of pre-
ceding philosophies and the normal development of philosophy
itself as a contributing cause to the Humanism of the Sophists.
The nature philosophers as we have seen accomplished little in
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the way of solutions. And thus there was a revolt from the
study of nature and a new interest developed because of the
importance of social and political life, in the nature of man.
The dictum of Protagoras, that man is the measure of all things,
may serve to show us the extent of this new interest that was
developing. At least the Sophists were on familiar ground
here, and this coupled with the inability of the general phil-
osophic mind to solve the relationships observed in the pheno-
mena of the senses with those observed by the mind led the
Sophists to more intelligible and practical considerations.
And no small part of the Humanism of the Sophists arises in
distrust of the mind to solve this vexed problem of knowledge
and truth. Even the epistemology of Protagoras, naive, though
it may seem to us, is a relatively easy disposal of a really
perplexing problem. There were matters far more pressing than
this awarting attention. And with human interests in politics,
social life, the professions and education clamoring for a
technique and equipment, we may be sure that the Sophists had
little time for metaphysics.
The causes underlying the Humanism of the Pragmatists and the
Instrumentalists,
a. Pragmatism represents a revolt from traditional phil-
osophy in all its forms. The old metaphysics with its
arguments from ontology, cosmology, design, no longer appeal
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to the Pragmatist. In fact, the existence of a supernatural
realm, idealistic or otherwise, has little appeal to the type
of mind represented by modern Humanism. The time has gone by
for sterile intellectualizing, for speculative inquiries into
a barren realm of metaphysics. Pragmatism represents a new
motive for philosophy* It discards the older rationalism and
empiricism because they were both interested in contemplation,
in mere intellectual exercises as to the nature of reality.
We clearly see this in the revolt from the logic of Aristotle,
with its emphasis on form, its a priori bases of approach, its
conception of a system of first truths. It is illustrated in
the Pragmatic attitude toward the old psychology and its int-
erest in behavioristic interpretations of the self and of con-
sciousness. Once again, we observe it in the throwing out of
the traditional epistemologies. Pragmatism feels the inade-
quacy and fruitlessness of these conceptions of experience,
and is anxious to formulate a new conception which shall serve
as a technique for world mastery in a practical sense.
Mastery of situations is of more importance than the under-
standing of metaphysical problems.
b. Pragmatism represents a new allegiance to and enthusiasm
for science, for inductive logic, for experiment, for in-
vestigation. It is careless about guaranteed worlds of any
sort. It believes that human effort can add both to the sum
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total of truth and of reality* As such it is impatient of
the older supernaturalism which served a former generation
as sanction for its psychology, logic, epistemology, and
metaphysics. It emphasizes the dignity and worthfulness of
man. Whatever gods there may be, the all important thing is
that man is master of his fate. Taking its cue from the sure
and steady march of the human intelligence from one victory
to another; noticing the sweeping economic advances made in
the direction of human improvement and amelioration, it is
quite impatient of all restraint imposed by authority, eccle-
siastical or otherwise, and is scornful of all human attitudes
that look beyond the strength of man f s right arm or the abi-
lity of man's mind for help in the solution of its problems.
As evidence of the soundness of this position it points with
pride to the achievements of the physical and natural sciences.
It is frankly naturalistic because of its scientific affilia-
tions. In former times philosophy was useless, but today it
is the most useful of the disciplines of the mind because
reflection now concerns itself with the solution of problems
and not the solving of puzzles.
c. Pragmatism represents a HumansdJ'kic conception of the
nature of Religion.
Keligion is not something given, but has followed the
same laws of genetic development as the sciences.
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Pragmatism is frankly naturalistic in its interpretation of
religion. Notice the development of religion around the con-
servation of social values; the organization of ethics around
the development of socially satisfactory customs, and we get
the standpoint of Pragmatism in this respect. Older philo-
sophy was interested in the development of a system of con-
cepts that would result in Absolute Idealism. But Dewey
thinks that the function of thought is purely instrumental,
and therefore has no need of metaphysics. Religion, with its
f^\o)ms
,
imagery
,
symbolism, exists for the service of democracy,
the creation of values for the social group. It has devel-
oped in the interests of human service as it has discarded
the old 'essence 1 philosophies, and Pragmatism has definite-
ly followed the development of religion in the direction of
greater practical humanistic enterprises. Of necessity we must
be brief in this connection, but sufficient has been said to
show that from the point of view of science, and philosophy
the primary interest of Pragmatism is Humanistic.
II. Criticism of the Sophists and the Pragmatists.
The final appraisal of the Sophists and the Pragmatists will
depend on the soundness of their technical position, no matter
how alluring their Humanism may be; for it may be set down
as a truism that no philosophy that is not inherently sound
can hope to win the allegiance of the reflective mind.
It is this phase of our problem to which we must now turn.
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We shall endeavor to show that Pragmatism either by its de-
finite failure to develop a sound basis for its structure, or
by its implications, psychological, logical, metaphysical,
has failed to do more than to offer a criticism of preceding
philosophy. The argument for this position will center it-
self on an examination of the criterion of truth of both the
Sophists and the Pragmatists; the failure to develop an ade-
quate psychology of the self, and their inability to work out
a definite technique for the conservation of values.
1. Criticism of the Sophist and Pragmatic criterion of truth.
Pragmatism is a criterion of truth. ^ The Sophists de-
voted most of their time to the investigation of the nature of
truth. The position of Protagoras is that sensation or per-
ception is truth. The difference between the Sophists and
Pragmatism seems to lie in the fact that Pragmatism represents
a real advance in this respect, because it makes truth what
is satisfactory as to consequences. The real difficulty with
the Sophists 1 position is that it makes for all manner of con-
tradictions in experience. Not only is this true in relation-
ship to different individuals, but also for the same individual
at different times. It is essentially an uncritical criterion.
2
We have seen the acute analysis of Plato and there is no need
to cover the ground again. But the Pragmatists deserve a
word more of criticism in respect to the criterion they have
1. p 36
2. p 76
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advanced. Starting with the reality of our sense experiences,
they say that truth consists in the satisfactory evaluation
of these experiences. This involves intellectual analysis.
But Royce has pointed out the incompleteness of this intellect-
ual analysis and has shown the need for recognizing that the
truth of judgments cannot be an individual affair. Let us
grant the importance and decisiveness of experimentation,
nevertheless this very method of experimentation does not give
us the coherence that is required of a system of truths, and
individual truths are not of the greatest value until they have
been harmoniously assembled in a coherent experience, the ex-
perience of a self. It is at this point that critical analy-
sis and reflection are needed, if the life of man is to be
interpreted in terms that are more than merely utilitarian.
Man is more than a nominalist ic creature. If he is not, then
it is idle to consider the appraisals made of him by such minds
as Milton and Shakespeare. He is essentially a synoptic being.
And this fact nominal! stic and experimental Pragmatism leaves
out of account. It is defective in that it makes no place
for universals; it has close affiliations with medieval nomi-
nalism, and is represented by the pragmatism of James. When
we turn to the type of Pragmatism represented by Dewey, we
find the same difficulty. Dewey regards man as a creature
who is constantly striving to adjust himself to an environ-
ment. And as far as he goes, he is essentially correct.
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Truth then is simply an instrumental affair. It for the
purpose of life, of action, of achievement. It is decidedly
challenging as a new reading in philosophy of the biological
interest. But we may well ask whether man is not a being who
sometimaes transcends biological relationships. If thinking
is defined merely as adjustment, the attempt to solve prob-
lems, we are cut off from many occupations and fields of life
in which this motive is at best secondary. Thus one can ima-
gine states of religious or artistic elevation in which this
biological emphasis is very slight, if present at all. The
fact is that the implied interpretation of man's nature re-
sulting from the use of this criterion is wholly inadequate
in the face of the facts. Granted the practical value of
the criterion, its workability, its functional value, is
there not yet the question as to Truth as a whole? The Prag-
matist has no word to say about this. He is interested only
in truths. Truth is a hypostati zation just as matter is or
even consciousness. But truths to be true, to have any sig-
nificance whatsoever, unless we are to speak unintelligibily,
must function in a system. We cannot talk of parts as James
does without the implication of wholes; we cannot think of
percepts without being /led to concepts and so to universals.
The difficulty with Pragmatism as a criterion is its non-
rational character; its emphasis on immediate needs, and the
implications it carries for utility and expediency. It is
this defect that it has in common with the Sophistic criter-
ion notwithstanding its apparently more developed character.
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Seri8ationalism or Pragmatism, they mean eventually the same
thing. If either one is accepted we cannot go on with the busi-
ness of philosophy and the business of philosophy is important
for life.
2. The criticism of the epistemology of the Sophists and the
Pragmati sts.
The evidence of any episteraological development among the
Sophists is quite scant. However, we have seen that there is
a naive dualism in the materialistic concept of knowledge ad-
vocated by Protagoras. But in reality this epistemology upon
analysis would turn out to be monistic realism. There are two
kinds of motion: that of objects without and that of the mind
within: but it must be remembered that this was essentially
the psychology of Democritus, that is, it was materialistic.
When we turn to James we find him ambiguous as to epistemology.
He says in one place that he means to be dualistic; but else-
where he follows Berkeley whose epistemology is monistic ideal-
ism. Dewey would appear to be frankly realistic and monistic
in his theory of knowledge. But in each of these cases we re-
gard their epistemology as defective. One of the real contri-
butions of logic has been the development of the theory of
objective reference. Knowledge must, if it is to be real,
refer to an object. Hence epistemological dualism is the
standpoint from which criticism of the Sophists and the Prag-
matists will be made in this connection.
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Perry has pointed out that the epistemology of Berkeley
is infected with the ego-centric predicament. It is assumed
that knowledge creates its object while in reality all it does
is to refer to it. The idealistic monism of some of the Prag-
matists is open to this same objection. James never freed
himself from the spell of Berkeley and quotes him approvingly
in his criticism of the material substance theories of Locke.
But the difficulty for monistic idealism is precisely that which
was pointed out by Hume. Hence whatever the difficulties of
dualism may be, at any rate this theory does preserve the in-
tegrity of the self and the integrity of the object of know-
ledge. A universe in which knower is emphasized at the ex-
pense of the known, leads logically to an All-Knower, a posi-
tion which James himself, apparently in one of his dualistio
moods, does not hesitate to criticise. On the other hand,
when we turn to Dewey and the biological pragmatists, their
theory compels us to regard man as nothing more than a psy-
cho-physical organism. Just as in the first place it would
be quite impossible ti> account for error, so here it is im-
possible to give a real interpretation of the independence
and nature of mind. Space forbids an extended discussion of
the problem of epistemology raised here. But sufficient has
been said to show that both mind and the objectivity of truth
must be secured in any discussion of this sort. Unpopular as
the Kantian interpretation of the nature of mind may be in
certain quarters, no philosophy that leaves it out of account
1« Present Philosophic Tendencies
, pp 128. See Ch 6 for a
criticism of monistic idealistic epistemology.
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can give us a satisfactory relation of the nature of experi-
ence* And in this respect the Pragraatists have failed, for
the problem of knowledge is just as important as the problem
of knowing, and notwithstanding Dewey at this point, the true
interest of philosophy is more than a genetic one. Pragma'-
tism fails because it does not give us a universe in which a
rational mind can really feel at home* At best we have been
given a picture of a biological creature whose chief interest
is in the acquisition of loaves and fishes.
3, Criticism of the psychology underlying the philosophy of
the Sophists and the Pragraatists,
It has been pointed out that the psychology of the Soph-
ists is sensationalistic and in all likelihood is modeled on
the teaching of Democritus. However, psychology is in its
infancy in the hands of Protagoras and Gorgias, The world
OT consciousness is a new field of investigation, and we may
not attach too much blame to the Sophists on this account.
Knowledge of the structure of consciousness is in its in-
fancy. It is not until the time of Aristotle that the soul
psychology develops as a sequence to the psychology of Plato
and his metaphysical creation of a system of Ideas which were
regarded as spiritual entities. That there was a traditional
recognition of the existence of the soul is evidenced from
the mythologies of Greece, But scientifically, the Sophists
began with the elements of consciousness and identified it
with perception. The criticism that is made then, must be
that their psychology was a wholly inadequate affair and took
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no account of reason as in the case of Socrates and Plato*
With Pragmatism the situation is somewhat different. The
field of psychological investigation has now been fully ex-
ploited. Soul psychology, associationism, functional psychol-
°gy t the development of behaviorism and the self psychology
have all had the fullest exposition. In this connection
James is of course historically our most famous modern psy-
chologist. And his psychology is moderate by comparison with
later developments. The emphasis throughout is functional
and involves a denial of the idea of substance or entity pre-
valent until Hume at any rate. But in connection with phil-
osophy we find James, for example, in Essays in Radical Em-
piricism, ^ moving toward the positions that have made de-
finitely behavioristic. And this involves Instrumentalism in
a dispute with the claims of the self psychology. Dewey T s
behaviorism is due to his stress on the importance of biolo-
gical functionalism in the relation of the organism to the
environment. But there is obviously a difference between
regarding biological interactions as one of the functions of
p
consciousness and regarding it as the only function. The
arguments for Behaviorism are well known and do not need to
be repeated here. But the important fact about consciousness
is that it is self expe&^enee. In addition to performing
functional adjustments it is a grouping of states that really
1. Brightman, Introduction to Philosophy , pp 58. Cf also
pp 59-58 for discussion of Pragmatism.
2. James, Essays in Radical Empiricism
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belong together in a whole or self. Behaviorism takes no
account of the reflective, the time-transcending and the uni-
fying characteristics of consciousness* Selection is regarded
as important because of its biological mission. But man is
also gifted with the power of reflecting on his adjustments
after they have been made; he also knows what selections are
good or bad, and his evaluation of his adjustments is an
important fact of self experience which must be taken into
account in any adequate exposition of the nature of conscious-
ness. The analysis of consciousness into its physiological
elements is doubtless serviceable to psychology, but we are
still reminded that even in biology things functions as wholes,
as units, whether simple or complex. Babies and bathtubs,
fishes and flowers, mastodons or men are units. And it is only
thus that objects are presented to us. As Brightman says:
"All consciousness is in the form of self experience.
The Pragmatists tend to pay less and less importance to the
self as a self. The witness of literature, of art, religion
and philosophy is arrayed against it, but most important of
all is the testimony of self-consciousness itself, and this
constitutes an answer difficult for Pragmatism to rebut.
It is the behavioristic psychology of Instrumentalism that lays
the ground work for its metaphysical naturalism and for its
1. For a comprehensive discussion of various psychologies see
Brightman, Introduction to Philosophy
.
Ch. 6
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ultimate inability to give a satisfactory account of values.
4. Criticism of the theory of Values developed by the
Sophists and the Pragmatists.
On the assumption that our preceding analyses are
correct, it is difficult to see how any real estimate of
values could have been formulated by the Sophists. For it
is the essence of sensationalism to be allied with what is
transcient, whereas values demand a permanent medium in
which to flourish. For values are values for a person. The
interest of the Sophists, if it lay in values at all, was
purely instrumental. As we have seen, they were careful
about the creation of efficiency, the development of for-
ensic ability, but beyond this they paid no attention to
the creation of values. That is, their interest lay large-
ly in the realm of instrumental values and not in the realm
of those which are permanent. They prepared men for a
particular task and this they must be given credit for.
But neither in the field of ethics nor metaphysics was their
thought sufficiently alert to the rational demand for values.
With the consideration of values as treated by
Pragmatism we have more to do. James undoubtedly means to
provide for the permanence of values. His treatment of God,
even though finite, makes him the conserver of such values
as are worthy of permanence in the world. But it is James
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the idealist rather than the Progmatist who is speaking
here. And it is significant that it is the theism of James
that is concerned with the fate of values. Dewey, on the
other hand, is frankly naturalistic in his estimate of values.
He denies, as we have seen, the eternal reality of values,
just as he denies the reality of a complete or final uni-
verse. Values are instruments created by the organism for
the furtherance of its own interests. As such they are
transient and perishable. History is the record of dis-
carded values. Civilization will develop and discard many
more. This is bound to be so in an evolutionary universe
like our own. Consider what values in evolution itself
have been transcended and thrown out. See in how many ways
values have been changed or modified in history. There is
no guarantee for the survival of any values except such as
have survival values. Peirce and Dewey both believe that
such values as may be preserved from time to time are social
and are such as will have social consequences for good.
But here again. Pragmatism is defective, for our deepest
instincts and desires are for the preservation of the great
historical, social and religious values which are the heri-
tage of man from a remote past. It is indeed a scathing
satire on evolution itself, if as a result of all that has
happened, values are to have no abiding place in social or
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personal experience. It is also a travesty on the nature
of the universe, if its drift is against the recognition
and conservation of values, De.wey f s thought needs to be
supplemented by that metaphysical view that he so cordially
despises. Let us grant the reality of a growing universe.
But let us also recognize that unless the theistic position
be essentially sound, then there can be no guarantee either
for the survival of values or of personality,
a. The real defect of the Pragmatic theory of values
arises again from its unwillingness, especially in later
or biological Pragmatism to look beyond the plane of what
is called successful living. It may be conceded that a
large part of human time and energy is consumed in making
such adjustments as will provide a livelihood. We know
that certain definite goods and ends are to be attained in
this sphere of human activity. But when life is regarded
only as successful living we notice a grave ambiguity in
the concept of values implied by Pragmatism, What is the
highest good? Many answers have been given to this question.
Hedonism, Energism, Intuitionalism, all provide possible an-
swers to this query. And Pragmatism is right in claiming
that we desire concrete values. In this respect it is much
better than the older Hedonism which talked about happiness
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in general, or Utilitarianism, which talked about the
greatest good for the greatest number. As Patrick says:
nBy instinct, habit, or custom, we crave
not happiness nor pleasure, specific
things. We want a piece of land, a new
oar, a dance-date, a fur coat..... a posi-
tion, a husband, a wife."l
But while it is true that we do seek concrete goods, physi-
cal and otherwise, it is also true that we do not rate these
as the highest goods or values in life. Consider what man-
ner of men Jesus, Socrates, Washington or Lincoln would have
been were this the case. As Patrick says again in this con-
nection:
"There are other things which we rank higher
—
genius, ability, devotion to ideals, heroism,
self-sacrifice, public service, originality.
Our biographies are not those of happy people." 2
It is true that Pragmatism is intensely interested in
social values. We saw that Peirce elaborated a fine concept
of social consequences, and we feel that he desires to have
men in the interests of the highest logic identify them-
selves with a community wider than their own. But it is not
only necessary to identify oneself with social interests,
but to specify what social interests are worthy of one's
allegiance. Increasingly our attention is being called to
the importance of social values, but unless we can develop
a set of social controls, all the goods that society creates
1. Patrick, Introduction to Philosophy
, p 411
2. Ibid, p 411
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will be destroyed. Control, discipline, respect for law,
even the limitation of desire and temperance in the art of
life, these are fundamental to any permanent progress in
the social order. 1
Furthermore, while Pragmatism is doing a real service
in calling our attention to values as instrumental, neverthe-
less, we are aware that the whole realm of esthetic and moral
values are important not merely instrumentally, hut funda-
mentally, intrinsically, for their own sake. Idealism has
found a place for such values as these, and it is doubtful
whether there can be either art or morality in any high sense
without a recognition of the fundamental character of the
values recognized in these fields. Plato, Hegel, and Kant
have called our attention to the importance of these esthe-
tic values which surely are not an adjunct of biological
living. Beauty, above all things, unless it be morality,
has an ideal value. We may even claim for it the rank of
permanency and ultimacy. An instrumental or subjective view
does not do its nature real justice. It is to Idealism that
we must turn for an adequate understanding of its place in
Nature and Reality and Experience.
Two important considerations must be taken into
account if we are to get an adequate understanding of the
place and nature of values in experience. These are (a) the
need of a standard by which the relative worth of values may
1. Patrick. Introduction to Philosophy
, p 4T5
'
£ For a discussion of this subject, see Plato, The Symposium ;
Kant, the Critique of Judgment .
3. Patrick, Introduction to Philosophy
, p 451. Also Everett,
Moral Values, Ch 7, and Brightman, Introduction to Philo-
sophy
, ch 5
~
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be judged, and (b) the recognition that values are grounded
objectively in the nature of reality. Let us consider these
briefly. Otherwise we have no way of making provision for
the evaluation of values and we have no guarantee that they
will be conserved. Unless we have standards or norms by
which values may be judged we are compelled to adopt some
unsatisfactory subjective theory of their nature. This is
actually implied in our every day judgments about men and
women. We are constantly saying that So and So has neither
taste nor appreciation in art or music or morality. The
very utterance implies some norm by which the judgment is
compared. As Brightman says:
"The ground for grouping into higher
and lower is found in the extent of the
contribution made by each value to the
coherent whole of life."l
In fact there can be no real classification of values with-
out some such standard of objective reference. And if we
are to get a truly metaphysical theory of values we shall
have to recognize that they jointly belong within a Whole.
But this implies Objectivity, for values cannot be referred
to any experience less than an Absolute One. And even where
one is not willing to take an idealistic standpoint, the
situation will still demand some kind of reference of values
to an existence in an objective universe. But any coherent
1. Brightman, Introduction to Philosophy
, p 146
2. See Spaulding. The Kew Rationalism
,
for a treatment of
Values from the Platonic standpoint.
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interpretation of the permanence and objectivity of values
must be grounded in some form of Idealism, Absolute or
Theistic. The reference to a Supreme Mind or Self as the
groundwork of reality carries with it the conviction that
the world is really safe for values. Any other interpreta-
tion scareely seems to be adequate. Our highest good is not
achieved unless we have ideal standards by which progress may
be made; these standards are implicit in all our judgments.
Finally, there can be no true morality and no true
art unless we can take these things out of the realm where
men simply say that they are good or bad because they like
or dislike them. Likewise, values and moral standards, if
we are to get a coherent, metaphysical understanding of
them, must be judged by reference to other considerations
than their usefulness, whether that usefulness be biological
or social. Thus with all its excellent qualities, Pragmatism
fails on many counts to provide us with the philosophy needed
by twentieth century men.

SUMMARY
Types of Sophistic Philosophy: a compari-
son of the Sophists and the Pragmatists,
submitted to the Faculty of the Boston Uni-
versity Graduate School in partial fulfil-
ments of the requirements for the degree
of Master of Arts.
Two important movements in philosophy are those represented
by Sophists and Pragmatists. The purpose of the thesis is to make
a study of each, with criticism in each case, and to make a criti-
cal comparison of each with reference to the philosophical needs
of man.
The Sophists and the Pragmatists are both treated as transi-
tional types of philosophy in contrast with Idealism which is
regarded as a major philosophical expression of the human mind.
The Sophists are discussed in relationship to their histori-
cal, political, ethical and religious background. Special atten-
tion is given to the development of the Sophists as a reaction
to former schools of philosophical thought in Greece. The place
of the Sophists in the life of Greece is of immense importance to
the practical affairs of Greek life. It is regarded as a philo-
sophy of success.
A definition of the Sophists is that of lovers of wisdom.
Attention is called to the more important leaders of the move-
ment and an outline of their teaching is presented. The sources
of the teaching of the Sophists are found in their common accep-
tance of previous flowing philosophies with their rejection of
the positions of the Eleatics. Their new interest and direction
of philosophy to the study of one phase of human experience is
due to their bewilderment because of the unsatisfactory conclu-
sions of the nature philosophers as to the nature of the world.
An exposition of the specific teachings of Protagoras and
Gorgias is given with reference to criterion of truth, theory
of knowledge, ethics and metaphysics. The Theory of knowledge
based on sense perception is examined in detail and an exposition
is given of the nominalism of Protagoras and the nihilism of
Gorgias. The relativistic character of the Sophistic ethics is
presented; their distinction between customary and natural right
and their essential humanism in ethics is presented.
Special attention is called to the bearings of the Sophist
epistemology on rhetoric. The Gorgias and The Clouds of Aristo-
phanes are referred to for an exposition and a satire on the
character of the rhetoric they developed. The rhetoric is shown
to be a matter of form rather than content and so characteristi-
cally sophistical.
The criticism of the Sophists centers around their education-
al practices. They are severely condemned by Plato for this

practice, but the criticism of Plato is somewhat tempered by the
conciliatory attitude of Zeller with reference to this matter.
However, it is evident that in absence of state regulation or
supervision, the practice was open to great abuse and accordingly
it is regarded as dangerous.
The Sophistic episteraology is criticized on the basis of its
over great simplicity, its inadequacy and the inability to found
any real validity or universality on its premises. Attention is
called to the defense made of the Sophists in this respect by
Grote. Gomperz and Schiller, but the position is taken that
Plato's criticism is in spite of this thoroughly sound, the posi-
tion being taken that monistic idealism is inadequate as a theory
of knowledge and dualism is presented as requisite. Only thus
can we account for error, furnish an adequate basis for the ob-
jective reference of knowledge. The Sophists were guilty of
superficiality; lacked adequate psychological apparatus, were
too intellectually discursive, and therefore presented an inade-
quate theory of knowledge.
The Ethics of the Sophists is criticized because of its ess-
ential relativism, their inability to get an adequate definition
of the chief good. The errors in their psychological hedonism
are pointed out. In opposition to this is set the criticism of
Socrates, as to the need of a rational foundation for conduct.
The metaphysics of the Sophists is dealt with briefly be-
cause only scanty evidence is afforded as to their teachings.
But it is pointed out that the Humanistic interests of the Soph-
ists prevented a thorough-going attitude toward metaphysics.
In conclusion it is shown that the Sophists failed because they
did not possess sufficient knowledge of their field of study;
they lacked instruments with which to work, and did not realize
the greatness of the problem that they started to investigate.
The discussion of Pragmatism centers around its connection
with the rise of the inductive sciences; its operation from the
basis of the new logic; its earnest affiliation with the experi-
mental sciences which arose consequent on the decline of the old
logic of Aristotle and the decline of authority based on a priori
considerations.
The chief representatives of Pragmatism are discussed.
Peirce develops the logical basis of Pragmatism by showing that
we know all we need to know about ideas when we know what their
consequences will be. He develops also the basis for the social
emphasis of Pragmatism by his doctrine of the logic of consider-
ing social consequences in action.
The philosophy of James calls attention to the fact that
philosophy is essentially a clash of human temperaments, tough
minded and tender minded being the chief types. He defines
Pragmatism as recognizing the importance of interest, consequence,
results in philosophy. The Pragmatist represents the empirical
2

temper in action. The cause "underlying Pragmatism: that is, the
inadequacy of rationalism from the point of view of Absolute
Idealism is discussed. Absolute Idealism is criticized because
of its speculative character, its remoteness from human experience,
its inability to satisfy our intellectual and moral demands*
The James* type of Pragmatism, the nominalistic, is outlined
as based on a criterion of truth, as a new approach to metaphysics
and religion. James 1 doctrine of truth is expounded, truth being
that which validates itself in human experience. The character
of truth is instrumental in the service of life, scientific be-
cause it provides for the place of new truth side by side with the
old.
The metaphysical doctrine of James consists largely of a
criticism of the classic substance or essence doctrines. He ad-
vocates Berkeleyan Idealism as his standpoint. His criticism of
the traditional ideas of God and matter centers around the concept
that if the world is good the idea that God created it would make
it neither better nor worse. Likewise, with respect to matter.
Materialism and theism must be judged by their probable effects
in human experience. It is for this reason that James prefers
to be theistic because theism identified with the welfare of the
future of the world. James then proceeds to develop his concept
of a finite God, based on the pluralistic view of the world. God
is described as an adventurous moral being having affinity and
sympathy with the moral nature of man* Thus James seeks to pre-
serve the moral interest in metaphysics. James claims the author-
ity of the Hebrew prophets for his conception of a finite God and
bases his pluralism on the teachings of Fechner.
The Pragmatism of Dewey is based on his revolt against classi-
cal types of rationalistic and empirical philosophy. The Greeks
and Kant failed in their expositions becasue they did not under-
stand the required motive in philosophy, which is not contempla-
tion but adjustment, alteration, conquest of reality by human
intelligence. The purpose of philosophy is to change reality and
not to indulge in dialectic and contemplation. The same detailed
criticism is made of the empiricists, Heraclitus and the moderns
for the same reason. Bergson, for example, gives us simply a
new presentation of the nature of reality but does nothing about
it* Greek philosophy failed because it was derived from art, the
joy in the finished. Modern philosophy must recognize a need of
vital and intelligent effort in the business of effecting change
in an incomplete and growing world.
Existence, according to Dewey, is perilous and must provide
safeguards for its perpetuation and expansion. This can be done
only through the devising of instruments for intelligent control
of existence.
Consciousness is described in naturalistic and behavioristic
terms. Consciousness is a complex of interactions with events*
It is not an entity nor a separate realm of being; it is a group-
ing of meanings* Thought then has a definite place in experience,
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it is instrumental in character. It is its function to respond to
stimuli coming from the external world. It is its function to
distinguish between what is coincident and coherent, not merely
to form symbols as in Platonism, or to construct images of the
nature of reality. The real business of thought is observation,
selection, appraisal, rather than contemplation. Thought, if it
is to mean anything, must be concrete and purposive. Thinking
is the solution of problems.
The social order as conceived by Absolutists does not square
with the actual situation. Its conception is not that of the
logic of general notions; the state is not an idea eternally
static and complete. This notion is responsible for the status
quo as a sacred concept in the minds of Idealists. It prevents
real progress and does not adequately appraise the place of the
individual within the state. The conceptual attitude toward the
state has historical value only, but must be regarded only as
instrumental to larger and wider concepts, for example, the con-
cept of the Inter- State. The real view of the state recognizes
the supreme importance of the individual and it is his interests,
not those of society, which are all important.
The ethics of Dewey is concerned with the detection of
remedies rather than following fixed ends, This follows from his
concept of the state. The advantage of this position is that
ethics is taken out of metaphysics and its subject matter is re-
garded as a problem for alleviation rather than discussion. Dewey
ignores the need of having a standard by which ills can be cor-
rected in his enthusiasm for Instrumentalistic ethics.
Values, according to Dewey, are subjective, having no exis-
tence apart from human desires. The objectivity of values or
their permanence is not recognized. Accordingly, we find Dewey
laying stress on means rather than on ends.
A summary of Pragmatism shows it to be interested in psy-
chology, a concept of the process of interaction between men and
their environment; logically, thought is instrumental in an or-
ganic world, and not separate from it; conduct is an active par-
ticipation in the creation of ideals and not participation in a
fixed scheme of things; politically, it stands for democracy as
opoosed to hierarchies of any sort. Metaphysically it is a phil-
osophy of change. Pragmatism claims to be a militant voluntar-
istic idealism.
Our criticism of Pragmatism is based on its claim to be a
philosophy of science; at best it is only a philosophy of evolu-
tion or the experimental sciences. Philosophy must take into
account the whole tff experience; this Pragmatism does not do.
Pragmatism is criticized as a criterion of truth. Joyce
points out that things are not true because they are useful, but
because they are harmonious parts of a larger whole of things.
This applies to all our judgments. This view is accepted as
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against that of Pragmatism.
The epistemology of Pragmatism is criticized because of its
shifting character in James; because of its realistic character
in Dewey. Dualism is presented as a stronger basis as it pro-
vides for the objective reference of thought, and because man is
not merely a biological organism, thought is given a place and
a dignity of its own.
The metaphysics of Pragmatism is recognized as furnishing
some interests in human points of view. However, we disagree
with James because his concept furnishes no guarantee that such
a God as he describes can permanently maintain himself; and be-
sides, James is guilty of over simplification of the problems
of metaphysics. Dewey leaves unanswered the major problem of meta-
physics, the origin of reality. As a result Pragmatic meta-
physics is incoherent because of its inadequate epistemology,
psychology and general outlook.
Final and general criticisms of Pragmatism are made on the
ground of its ambiguity, its tendency to relativism, its neglect
of ends or inability to define them clearly, and its strength
as a criticism of preceding philosophies rather than its elabor-
ation of a satisfactory philosophy in the place of the systems
it revolts from.
The comparison and criticism of the Sophists and the Prag-
matists is based on the recognition of their common Humanistic
position, on their common tendency to Naturalism, and on their
inadequacy in the fields of logic, psychology and epistemology.
Their account of experience is partial and not coherent.
As for the Sophists, Protagoras and Gorgias are represen-
tatives of the Humanist position; and in the case of the Prag-
matists, the interest of James, Schiller and Dewey is Humanistic
and social. The causes contributing to this Humanism are simi-
lar; in Greece, it was the rise of national consciousness, de-
mocracy, the expansion of knowledge, and the failure of their
predecessors to outline a coherent philosophy of Nature. In
the case of the Pragmatists, the causes are the revolt from
rationalistic metaphysics, vicious intellectualism, the break-
down of formal logic, the decline of authority. And on the
other hand an enthusiasm for the new logic, for a new appraisal
of empiricism, a new emphasis on the worth of the individual,
the value of democracy, and its affiliation with the natural-
istic development of science. Both are interested in a Human-
istic concept of religion. Values are social. Religion is con-
cerned with the conservation of values for a social group. Re-
ligion therefore has no need of metaphysics.
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The criticism of the Sophists and the Pragmatists is
based on the unsoundness of their technical position in spite
of the alluring character of their claims. Thus this unsound-
ness is seen in their inadequate criterion of truth and theory
of knowledge. Man is more than a sensational and nominalistic
creature. Pragmatism is true as far as it goes, but it does not
go far enough. Likewise with their epistemology, whether monis-
tic or realistic. It is infected with error. In any case, Prag-
matism does not do justice to the mind or to the world, the world
of objective reference. When it appears as monistic idealism,
it is inadequate and when it appears as pan-objectivism it is
inadequate.
The psychology of the Sophists is sensational and material-
istic as based on Democritus. At best it $s nominalistic and
therefore unsatisfactory. In the case of Pragmatism, functional
psychology in James tends to pass into behaviorism in Dewey.
Behaviorism is inadequate because it does not adequately assess
experience; because it does not regard experience as experience
for a self; because it fails to see that the preferential function
of consciousness is something more than biological, because the
analytic view of consciousness needs to be supplemented with the
synoptic view of consciousness.
The value concepts of the Pragmatists and the Sophists do
not take into account the intrinsic value of values. James means
to provide for their permanence in his finite God, but as we have
seen cannot make adequate provision in this respect. Dewey is
naturalistic and regards values as social, empirical, in origin
and makes no metaphysical provision for their conservation.
The trouble with Instrumental sm arises from its unwillingness
to regard man as something more than a biological organism. But
experience is sufficient to refute this position. Pragmatism
is interested in social values, but not all useful social values.
Thus esthetic and moral values are neglected by Pragmatism.
Furthermore, Pragmatism neglects to set up a norm by which the
evaluation of values can be made, and fails to recognize that
social values or any other kind cannot really be values unless
they are objectively grounded in reality and not merely formulas
of expediency and utility.
The answer to Pragmatism is in Idealism. This only gives
us a coherent account of all experiences.
-6

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Part One: The Sophists
I. Literature specifically the teachings of the Sophist
Plato, Dialogues , translated by B. Jowett, 4 vols., N»Y«
Scribners, 1871.
a. Dialogues dealing with Gorgias :
Apology
.
19
Gorgias
.
entire
Meno
.
70. 73, 76, 95, 96
TnTTebtis
.
58, 59
Phaedrus
.
261, 267
Symposium
.
198
b. Dialogues dealing with Hippias :
Apology
.
19 et seq.
Phaedrus
.
267
Protagoras
.
314 et seq.
c. Dialogues dealing with Prodicus :
Apology
.
19
Charmides
.
163
CratylusT 384
Euthydemus 277-305
Laches. "T97
Meno
.
75. 75
Phaedrus
.
367
Protagoras, enti re
Republic r^LO. 600
Symposium
.
177
d. Dialogues dealing with Protagoras :
Cratylus
. 385, 386, 391
Euthydemus
.
286
Meno
.
91
Phaedrus
.
267
Protagoras , entire
Republie7~10. 600

Sophist
.
232
Thaetetus
.
152-178
II. Greek Literature with some references to the Sophists.
Aristophanes
Aristotle
Diogenes Laertius
Plutarch
Xenophon
Lucian
The Clouds
Oxford, 1918
Rhetoric
Oxford, 1908
Lives of the Philosophers
Loeb Classical Library, N.Y. Putnams
Against Colotes
Transit toy W. H. Goodwin, 5 vols.,
Boston, 1906 See Vol 5, pp 336-385
Memorabilia
Boston, (Jinn & Company
Dialogues
London, Bell & Sons, 1888
III. References to the Sophists in general philosophic literature.
Adams on, R.
Armstrong, A. C.
Bakewell, C.
Brightman, E. S.
Burnet, J
•
Conger, G. P.
Cushman, E. C.
Gomperz, Th.
The Development of Greek Philosophy
Edinboro, Blackwood, 1908
Transitional Eras
New York, Macmillan, 1904
Source Book in Greek Philosophy
New York, Scribners, 1907
An Introduction to Philosophy
New York, Holt, 19^4
Early Greek Philosophy-
London, Adam and Charles Black, 1908
A Course in Philosophy
New York, Harcourt. Brace, 1924
A BEGINNER'S History of Philosophy
2 vols, New York, Houghton, Mifi'lin,
1918, Vol 1, pp 55-73
Greek Thinkers
4 vols, transl. by Laurie Magnus,
New York, Scribners, 1905

Grote, George
Pater, W.
Rogers, A. £•
Schiller, F. C. S.
Thilly, F.
Weber, A*
Windelband, W.
Zeller, E.
Part Two:
Bawden, H. H.
Boodin, J. E.
Bradley, F. H.
Brightman, E. S.
Caldwell, W.
Cams, P.
Coe, G. A.
Dewey, J«
History of Greece
Vol 8, pp 474-544, London, 1850
Plato and Platonism
London, Macmillan, 1922
A Student's History of Philosophy
Hew York, Macmillan, 1921
Studies in Humanism
, pp 23-70
London, 2nd ed, 1912
A History of Philosophy
pp 40-47, Hew Yorfc, Holt, 1914
History of Philosophy , transl. by
Thilly and Perry, New York, Scrib-
ners, 1925
A History of Philosophy
New York, Macmillan, 1893
The Pre- Socratic Philosophy
2 vols, transl. by S. F. Alleyn
The Pragmatists
Principle s of Pragmati sm
Hew York, Houghton, 1910
Truth and Reality
Hew York, Macmillan, 1911
Appearance and Reality
New York, Macmillan, 1911
Introduction to Philosophy
Hew York, Holt, 1924
Pragmatism and Idealism
Hew York, Macmillan, 1913
Trtith on Trial
TOTcago, Open Court, 1911
Psychology of Religion
Chicago, University of Chicago
Press, 1916
The Influence of Darwin on Phil-
osophy
,
Hew York. Holt. 1917

Driscoll, J. T.
Everett, W. G.
Geiger, J. R.
Hoffding, H.
James, W.
Laguna, T, de.
Lyman, E # W«
Creative Intelligence
New York, Holt, 1917
Essays in Experimental Logic
Chicago, 1914
Studies in Logical Theory
Chicago, 1903
How We Think
Boston, 1910
Experience and Nature
cutce go, Open Court, 1924
Pragmatism and the Problem of
the Idea , New York. Longmans, 1915
Moral Values,
New York, Holt, 1918
Some Religious Implications of
Pragmatism
,
Chicago, 1919
Philosophy of Religion
London, Macmillan, 1914
Pragmatism
New York, Longmans, Green, 1909
The Meaning of Truth
New York, Longmans, Green, 1909
A Pluralistic Universe
New York, Longmans, Green, 1909
Some Problems of Philosophy
New York, Longmans, Green, 1911
Essays in Radical Empiricism
New York, Longmans, Green, 1912
The Will to Believe
New York, Longmans, Green, 1896
Dogmatism and Evolution
New York, Macmillan, 1910
Theology and Human Problems
New York, Scribners, 1910
t t
Maodonald, L, B»
Macintosh, D. C,
Moore, A, W.
More, P. E.
Murray, D« L.
Patrick, G. T. W.
Peirde, C.
Perry, R.
Rogers, A. K.
Rouce, J.
Russell, B. M.
Setha, A.
Schiller, P. C. S.
Life in the Making
Boston, Sherman French, 1911
The Problem of Knowledge
New York, Macmillan, 1915
Pragmatism and its Critics
Chicago, 19 1U
The Pragmatism of William James
ShelDurne Essays, Vol 7, pp 195-212
Pragmatism
London, 1912
Introducti on to Philosophy
New York, Houghton, Mifflin, 1924
Chance, Love and Logic
New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1923
Present Philosophical Tendencies
New York, Longmans, Green and Co.
1921
English and American Philosophy
Since 18017
New York, Macmillan, 1923
The World and the Individual
2 Vols, New York, 1904
The Spirit of Modern Philosophy
tfew York, Houghton, Mifflin, 1892
Lectures on Modern Idealism
New Haven, Yale University Press,
1923
Philosophical Essays
London, 1910
Man 1 s Place in the Cosmos
Edinfcoro, 1897
Humani sm
London, 2nd ed., 1912
Studies in Humanism
London, Macmillan, 2nd ed, 1912
Riddles of the Sphinx
London, 191©
Formal Logic
London, 1910
# *
Spaulding, E. G. The New Rationalism
New York, Holt, 1918
Sheldon, W. H.
Sturt, H. C.
Wright, W. K.
The Strife of Systems
Harvard University Press, 1918
Personal Idealism
London, 1902
A Student's Philosophy of Religion
New York, Macmillan, 1918
Literature on Pragmatism in Periodicals
Bode, F. H.
Boodin, J • E«
Fite, W.
Lee, V.
Lovejoy, A. 0.
L^oyd, A. H*
Moore, A. W.
Objective Idealism and its Critics
Philosophic Review, Vol 17,
pp 597-609
Paradoxes of Pragmatism
Monist, Vol 2J3, pp 112-122
The Nature of Truth
,
Philosophic Review, Vol 19,
pp 395-417
Pragmatism and Truth
Philosophic Review, vol 23,
pp 507-524
Pragmatism and Science
Philosophic Review, Vol 23,
pp 410-419
What is Truth? A Criticism of
Pragmatism
Yale Review, (n.s.) Vol 1,
pp 600-619
Pragmatism and the New Materialism
Journal of Philosophy, vol 19
pp 5-15 January, 1912
Pragmatism and Metaphysics
Journal of Philosophy, Vol 14 (1917)
Pragmatism and its Critics
Philosophic Review, Vol 14, pp 322-343
Pragmatism Science and Truth
Philosophic Review, vol 24 (Nov 1915)
pp 631-638

Perry, R. B.
Rogers, A.
Royce, J.
Russell, J. E.
Sabin, E. E.
Seth, J.
Smith, T. V.
Talbot, E. B.
Thilly, F.
Turner, W.
The Philosophy of William James
Philosophic Review, Vol SO, pp 1-29
James* Theory of Knowledge
Philosophic Review, vol 13, pp 577-
596
Pragmatism and Dualism
Philosophic Review, Vol 27, pp 21-38
The Eternal and the Practical
Philosophic Review vol 13, pp 113-142
The Epistemologv of Pragmatism and
RadicaTTimpi rici sm
Philosophic Review, Vol 15,
pp 406-413
Some Difficulties in James* Prag-
mati sm
Journal of Philosophy, Vol 15 (1908)
pp 309-322
Pragma tist and Idealist Ethics
Philosophical Review, Vol 32, pp 182
and following
Dewey's theory of Value
Monist, Vol 32, (July, 19 12
)
pp 339-354
Fichte and Pragmatism
Philosophic Review, Sept, 1907
The Self
Philosophic Review, Vol 19, pp 22-33
Pragmatism. What Does It Mean?
^he Catholic World, Vol 94,
—
(Nov. 1911) pp 178-189

'J

ZA9-QZ
NOT TO BE TAKEN
FROM THE LIBRARY

